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I. INTRODUCTION
Employer lawsuits motivated by a desire to retaliate against
employees exercising their self-organization rights under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act' (NLRA or the Act) raise difficult
problems. On the one hand, the National Labor Relations Board2
(NLRB or the Board) and the courts have construed section
8(a)(1) of the Acts to prohibit a wide range and variety of conduct
designed to defeat employees' organizational rights.4 On the other
hand, courts have construed the first amendment 5 to protect a liti-
gant's .right of access to the courts.6 Moreover, a prohibition on
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
2. The NLRB is the agency created by Congress to administer the Act. 29 U.S.C.
§ 153(b)(1982) sets forth the Board's powers.
3. Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982), provides: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer-to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title .... .
Section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), provides: "Employees shall have the right
to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... "
4. See, e.g., Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 104 S. Ct. 2803 (1984) (employer violated Act by
requesting the Immigration & Naturalization Service to investigate the status of undocu-
mented alien employees solely because the employees supported the union); NLRB v. Ex-
change Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964) (employer violated Act by permanently and uncondi-
tionally granting economic benefits to its employees during the course of an organizational
campaign, for the purpose of inducing the employees to reject the union in the Board-or-
dered representation election); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (em-
ployer violated Act by restricting employee union solicitation during nonworking time and
distribution during nonworking time in nonworking areas because the restrictions were not
necessary to maintain production or discipline); Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062
(1967) (employer polling of employees concerning their union activities generally violates
the Act, absent legitimate purpose and proper safeguards).
5. The first amendment forbids governmental action that abridges "the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
6. See California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972).
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civil suits involving state law claims ignores substantial state inter-
ests traditionally asserted to protect the general welfare.7
In the NLRA context, the employer's right to sue employee-
organizers during a union-organizing campaign is in tension with
the right of employees to organize.8 When employees seek to im-
prove their bargaining status by attempting to band together, their
attempts are undercut if their employer hales them into court for
conduct and activities carried out in furtherance of their efforts to
persuade other employees to join with them. But under the peti-
tion clause of the first amendment, to protect employees from re-
taliatory lawsuits by prohibiting and enjoining such suits would
impinge upon an employer's right of access to seek judicial redress
of wrongs that it has suffered notwithstanding any retaliatory
motive.
The Supreme Court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB9 recently resolved this tension in favor of the employer by
holding that the filing and prosecution of a well-founded, albeit
retaliatory, lawsuit may not be enjoined permanently as an unfair
labor practice. Employers may misperceive the Bill Johnson's deci-
sion as tacit permission to initiate nonfrivolous, retaliatory law-
suits1 ° in response to union-organizing campaigns without fear of
7. See, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (hold-
ing that if party to labor dispute circulates false and defamatory statements during union-
organizing campaign, court has jurisdiction to apply state remedies; plaintiff must prove
malice and injury, however).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 66-92. There have been three discussions of the
status of retaliatory lawsuits under the NLRA. See Note, Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB: Reasonably Based, Unpreempted Lawsuits Pronounced Palatable and Unenjoin-
able, Despite Improper (Retaliatory) Motivation, 45 LA. L. REv. 951 (1985) (concluding that
Board should find retaliatory motive when employer files state court lawsuit only in most
extreme cases); Recent Cases, Employers' Right of Access to State Courts, 33 DE PAUL L.
REv. 611 (1984) (concluding that the Supreme Court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983), correctly held that reasonably based retaliatory suits may not
be permanently enjoined); Comment, Employer Lawsuits Against Employees-The Right
to Invoke the Legal Process Despite Anti-Union Motivation or Coercive Effect on Section 7
Rights, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 880 (arguing that initiating a retaliatory suit is a management
prerogative that the NLRA does not prohibit); see also Note, The NLRB's Discovery Prac-
tice and the Procedural Effect of Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. National Labor Rela-
tions Board, 25 B.C.L. REv. 805 (1984) (pointing out that the Bill Johnson's holding may
encourage frivolous state court suits for purpose of utilizing state court discovery proce-
dures). In addition, a journalist has argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Bill John-
son's will cause employees to refrain from speaking critically of their employer. Hentoff,
Libel and Labor, THE PROGRnssrva, Nov. 1983, at 25.
9. 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
10. Using the factors of the employer's motivation for suing and the substantiality of
the suit's claims, lawsuits may be divided into four categories: (1) retaliatory and frivolous;
(2) retaliatory and nonfrivolous; (3) nonretaliatory and frivolous; and (4) nonretaliatory and
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NLRB intervention." Consequently, the likelihood exists that em-
ployers may begin using this weapon in a sophisticated fashion to
thwart organizing drives by their unorganized employees.
12
nonfrivolous.
This Article focuses on nonfrivolous, retaliatory lawsuits initiated during a union-or-
ganizing campaign. Neither nonretaliatory lawsuits, whether frivolous or not, nor frivolous,
retaliatory lawsuits raise the concerns addressed in this Article. Nonretaliatory suits appar-
ently do not run afoul of § 8(a)(1) of the Act regardless of whether they are well-founded,
and frivolous, retaliatory suits are not entitled to any first amendment protection. See infra
text accompanying notes 14-65.
A suit is retaliatory if the employer was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to retali-
ate against its employees for engaging in activities protected by § 7 of the Act. A suit is
nonretaliatory if the employees' exercise of statutory rights was not a motivating factor in
the employer's decision to sue. A nonretaliatory suit sometimes is referred to as a good faith
suit. See id.
A suit is frivolous if it lacks a reasonable basis either in fact or in law. A frivolous suit
sometimes is referred to as baseless, a sham, lacking a reasonable basis, based on insubstan-
tial claims, or lacking probable cause. A suit is nonfrivolous if some basis exists for a judg-
ment favorable to the employer. A nonfrivolous suit sometimes is referred to as well-
founded, having a reasonable basis, having a substantial claim, or raising a genuine issue of
fact or law. Nonfrivolous is not, however, synonymous with meritorious. After trial an em-
ployer may lose a reasonably based suit on the merits, at which time the Board may deter-
mine that the suit is an unfair labor practice if it finds that the employer's motivation in
filing the suit was retaliatory. See id. Note that the factors of motivation and substantiality
of the suit are not unrelated, however, because the frivolous nature of a lawsuit may be used
to infer the employer's true motive in initiating the suit. See id.
11. Such suits, however, are not totally free of regulation. If the employer's nonfrivo-
lous, retaliatory suit is not litigated to a successful conclusion, the Board may find that the
suit was an unfair labor practice and order appropriate remedial relief, after the suit is
concluded. Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 747.
12. The standard for avoiding a Board initiated permanent injunction of a lawsuit
during an organizational campaign is rather easy to meet. An employer need only allege a
claim that raises a genuine issue of material fact or law. If the employer's complaint raises
such an issue, the Board may not seek to have the suit permanently enjoined until after the
court has decided the disputed issue. This is true even if the employer's reason for filing the
suit was to interfere with the organizing drive. Id. at 745-47. It probably would be a very
unusual organizational campaign if the employer could not state a claim that raised a genu-
ine question as to whether it had been defamed, whether the employees had interfered with
its business, or whether they had trespassed upon its property.
The fears of union lawyers and the hopes of management lawyers concerning the impact
of the Court's decision in Bill Johnson's have been vividly stated as follows:
Bill Johnson's Restaurant is going to be the delight of those employers who want to
keep their workers in their docile place.
As one labor attorney told me, "Until now, most of what workers and organizers
say during a labor dispute has had strong protection under Federal labor law and sev-
eral previous Supreme Court decisions. But management has now been given a li-
cense-through the law of libel-to punish labor organizers and dissident workers....
And half of management's own legal fees in these [libel suits] are tax-deductible as
business expenses . . . Bill Johnson's Restaurant may eventually freeze workers' free-
speech rights against management."
The apparent loophole offered by the Supreme Court---if the boss's libel action is
frivolous, you can have it thrown out-is not going to be of much use. Arthur Fox, an
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The national labor policy of encouraging collective bargain-
ing 3 will be threatened if the use of retaliatory suits to deter work-
ers from organizing becomes widespread. In the wake of Bill John-
son's the Board must be prepared to respond to the retaliatory suit
tactic in a manner that safeguards employees' statutory self-organ-
ization rights without impinging impermissibly upon employers'
constitutional petition rights or ignoring the states' interest in
maintaining domestic peace.
The purpose of this Article is to examine the right of an em-
ployer to commence a nonfrivolous, retaliatory suit during an orga-
nizational campaign, and to suggest a reasonable reconciliation of
the conflict between the employees' right to form and join unions
without employer interference and the employer's right to petition
the judiciary for redress of wrongs. Part II describes the Court's
Bill Johnson's decision and its accommodation of competing inter-
ests. Part III addresses the weaknesses of the current remedies
available to the Board and proposes an accommodation that better
promotes the national labor policy of. encouraging collective bar-
gaining. This proposal regulates the timing of the employer's suit
attorney for the Public Citizen Litigation Group in Washington, points out that "any
plaintiff's lawyer can always frame a libel complaint in sufficient detail to preclude its
being dismissed as baseless."
"And once the case is in the system," Fox adds, "the plaintiffs-the employers, in
this instance-are entitled to go on the most sweeping voyages of discovery. They can
depose everyone involved, and you're vulnerable in a deposition unless you have a law-
yer. . . . Moreover, depositions in these libel suits can be used to intimidate work-
ers. . . . They can ask all kinds of chilling questions."
Hentoff, supra note 8, at 27 (emphasis in original).
13. This statement of national labor policy is incorporated expressly in § 1 of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982): "It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce. . . by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by work-
ers of full freedom of. . . self-organization. . . ." The policy statement of § 1 is not mere
surplusage safely to be ignored. This point is particularly clear in light of the express lan-
guage of § 10(c), which commands the Board to fashion such remedies "as will effectuate the
policies of this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
The Act seeks to enhance collective bargaining for its own sake because of its presumed
mediating or therapeutic impact on industrial conflict. In the words of Congress: "Experi-
ence has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes
the flow of commerce. . . by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment
of industrial disputes . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). This premise has developed into a
philosophy of collective bargaining as an ideal of rational and informed persuasion. Accord-
ing to this view, much industrial conflict could be alleviated simply by an intelligent ex-
change of views and information at the bargaining table. See generally Cox, The Duty to
Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HAZv. L. REv. 1401, 1408-09 (1958) (collective bargaining enables
both parties to work around their prejudices and exchange viewpoints).
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during a union organizing drive without altogether prohibiting
such a suit. Part IV examines the history of the Board's effort to
regulate retaliatory lawsuits. This history reveals that giving em-
ployers an unfettered right to sue is unsatisfactory but that the
right of access to the courts is an important interest that must be
protected. Part V analyzes the constitutional aspects of the Court's
decision in Bill Johnson's and suggests that the constitutional
right of access to the courts is not as clear cut as Bill Johnson's
might indicate. Finally, part VI explains why the proposed accom-
modation is neither insensitive to the state's interest in protecting
the health and welfare of its citizens nor an impermissible infringe-
ment of the employer's right to sue.
II. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB
In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB 14 the Supreme
Court was confronted with the legality of an employer's retaliatory
lawsuit under the NLRA. Bill Johnson's arose out of an effort by a
few waitresses to organize for the purpose of bargaining collectively
with their employer.' 5 One of the waitresses filed an unfair labor
practice charge with the Board, alleging that she had been dis-
charged because of her union-organizing efforts. On the same day
that the Board's General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that
the employer had violated subsections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by
discharging the waitress, she and four other waitresses began pick-
eting the employer.16 Five days after the picketing began, the em-
ployer 17 filed a civil complaint against the picketers, which con-
14. 461 U.S. 731 (1983).
15. The particular restaurant involved was known publicly as "Bill Johnson's Big Ap-
ple East" and was located in Phoenix, Arizona. Id. at 733.
16. Shortly after the picketing began, the restaurant manager confronted and
threatened to "get even" with the picketers. Later, the employer's president threatened the
husband of one of the picketing waitresses by telephone. The husbands of two of the wait-
resses participated in the picketing, which continued for three days. Bill Johnson's Restau-
rants, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 155, 161-62 (1980).
The afternoon the picketing began, the employer's president telephoned the husband of
one of the picketing waitresses, who himself had participated in the picketing, and asked
why he and his wife had been picketing the restaurant. When the husband said they were
protesting the discharge of one of the waitresses, the employer's president said that she
would hate to see them lose the new home they had bought and, twice during the conversa-
tion, stated that she would hate to see them "get hurt by all of this." Id. at 162.
On the third day of picketing, the picketers distributed a leaflet that accused the em-
ployer's management of making "[u]nwarranted sexual advances" and maintaining a "filthy
restroom for women employees." Id.
17. Besides the employer, three co-owners of the employer joined as plaintiffs. 249
N.L.R.B. at 162 n.20; 461 U.S. at 734.
1240 [Vol. 38:1235
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tained claims for defamation and interference with business.'8 The
complaint sought compensatory damages, $500,000 in punitive
damages, and injunctive relief.'
The discharged waitress filed a second charge with the Board
alleging that the lawsuit had been filed with the intent to retaliate
against the defendants for their exercise of statutory rights.20 The
General Counsel issued a complaint based on this charge, alleging
that the employer's lawsuit violated subsections 8(a)(1) and (4) of
the Act.
21
After a four-day hearing during which the administrative law
judge (ALJ) heard evidence concerning the employer's basis for its
lawsuit, the ALJ concluded that the employer's lawsuit lacked a
reasonable basis and had been filed with a retaliatory motive.22
Pursuant to the Board's decisions in Power Systems, Inc.,25 George
R. Angle,24 and United Credit Bureau of America, Inc.,25 the ALJ
18. The complaint alleged that the named defendants, John Does I to X, and Jane
Does I to X had engaged in mass picketing, harassed customers, blocked public access to the
restaurant, and created a threat to public safety. The complaint also alleged that the picket-
ers had distributed with malicious intent a leaflet containing false and outrageous state-
ments. 461 U.S. at 734. On the same day it filed its lawsuit the employer distributed a letter
to its employees urging them to reject organization efforts. 249 N.L.R.B. at 162.
19. 249 N.L.R.B. at 162; 461 U.S. at 734. At the same time the employer ified the
complaint, it also sought a temporary restraining order and filed a motion to shorten the
time for taking depositions. 249 N.L.R.B. at 162-63. Although the defendants were not rep-
resented by counsel, the court issued a temporary restraining order granting most of the
relief the employer requested. The court also granted the employer's motion setting the
depositions of the defendants to begin two days after the filing of the complaint.
At the depositions of the defendants, the employer's attorney asked numerous ques-
tions regarding the nature and extent of the defendants' union activities, the identities of
other employees involved in such activities, and the extent to which the supervisors knew of
these activities. The employer's attorneys also sought to discover evidence possessed by the
defendants concerning the employer's union animus and information about the defendants'
compliance with various restaurant rules. Id. at 163.
20. 461 U.S. at 734-35.
21. Four days after the General Counsel's complaint issued, the regional director peti-
tioned the federal district court, pursuant to § 10(j) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1600) (1982), for
an order enjoining the employer from maintaining its lawsuit pending a final Board deci-
sion. The district court denied the regional director's request. 461 U.S. at 735 n.2.
22. 249 N.L.R.B. at 168-69. While the AJ had the matter under submission, the state
court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the business interference
claims but denied summary judgment on the libel count. 461 U.S. at 735 n.2.
23. 239 N.L.R.B. 445, 449-50 (1978), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979);
see infra text accompanying notes 166-70 (discussion of history and import of Power Sys-
tems analysis).
24. 242 N.L.R.B. 744, 749 (1979), enforced, 683 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1982); see infra
text accompanying notes 166-70.
25. 242 N.L.R.B. 921, 925-26 (1979), enforced, 643 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 994 (1981); see infra text accompanying notes 166-70.
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held that the employer had violated subsections 8(a)(1) and (4) of
the NLRA by initiating the lawsuit. The Board adopted the ALJ's
decision and ordered the employer to withdraw the civil suit and to
reimburse the defendants for the legal expenses they had
incurred.26
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the Board's decision and enforced its order. The court
agreed with the Board that the filing of a civil suit against an em-
ployee in bad faith and without a reasonable basis could be an un-
fair labor practice. In concluding that the lawsuit lacked a reasona-
ble basis, 8 the court reviewed the record and noted that the
employer failed to produce any evidence that would demonstrate
that its complaint had a reasonable basis in fact.29 According to
the court, the employer's threats, the timing of the lawsuit, and the
employer's immediate use of the lawsuit to depose the discharged
employee about the identities of other prounion employees all
combined to demonstrate the employer's retaliatory motive.30
The court rejected the employer's contention that "its lawsuit
had a reasonable basis because the complaint on its face was sub-
ject to state court jurisdiction."3 1 According to the court, "[m]ore
than a carefully drawn complaint is required to avoid a finding
that a lawsuit lacks a reasonable basis."32 The court also rejected
the employer's assertion that the Board could not order the em-
ployer to withdraw the state court lawsuit.3 Although the court
noted that this case "involved a delicate balance between federal
and state interests," it concluded that the Board's power to enforce
the NLRA would be "largely crippled if it could not order the
withdrawal of retaliatory lawsuits."34
The Supreme Court granted the employer's petition for certio-
rari35 to determine whether the Board properly could order the
employer's retaliatory lawsuit to be withdrawn permanently. The
26. 249 N.L.R.B. at 170.
27. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 660 F.2d 1335 (9th Cir. 1981).
28. The court of appeals found "substantial evidence in the record to support the
Board's findings that [the employer's] lawsuit lacked a reasonable basis in fact, and that it
was filed to penalize [the discharged employee] for filing charges with the Board and to
penalize the picketers for engaging in protected activity." Id. at 1342.
29. Id. at 1342-43.
30. Id. at 1343.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1344.
34. Id.
35. 459 U.S. 942 (1982).
1242 [Vol. 38:1235
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Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded
the case for further proceedings.3 6 Justice White, writing for a
unanimous Court, began by declaring that the issue was whether
the Board may prohibit the prosecution of a retaliatory suit "with-
out also finding that the suit lacks a reasonable basis in fact or
law." 3 7 Neither the Board nor the court of appeals had addressed
this issue because both had found expressly that the employer's
suit lacked a reasonable basis in fact. Whether the Board could
prohibit the prosecution of a reasonably based retaliatory suit be-
came the issue only after the Court determined that the Board's
procedure for making the reasonable basis determination was
improper.3
After conceding that a lawsuit may be a "powerful instru-
ment" for restraining employees from exercising their statutory
rights, 9 the Court emphasized that prohibiting the filing or prose-
cution of a state court suit infringes upon constitutional rights and
compelling state interests.40 The constitutional right is the first
amendment petition right.4' The state's interest is maintaining do-
mestic peace by providing a civil remedy for tortious conduct dur-
ing a labor dispute. 42 In light of these two considerations, the Su-
preme Court held that "[t]he filing and prosecution of a well-
founded lawsuit may not be enjoined as an unfair labor practice,
even if it would not have been commenced but for the plaintiff's
desire to retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights pro-
tected by the Act."
'4 3
The Court, however, distinguished a meritorious action44 from
a suit based on insubstantial claims.45 Prosecuting a meritorious
36. 461 U.S. 731, 749 (1983).
37. Id. at 733.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 49-53.
39. 461 U.S. at 740.
40. Id. at 741-42.
41. See supra note 5.
42. 461 U.S. at 741-42.
43. Id. at 743. The Court conceded that § 8(a)(1) and (4) reasonably could be con-
strued to prohibit the filing of a well-founded lawsuit for a retaliatory motive were it not for
the "weighty countervailing considerations" of the first amendment and the states' compel-
ling interest. Id. at 742-43.
44. A "meritorious" suit is not to be confused with a "well-founded" or "reasonably
based" suit. A reasonably based suit may prove to be unmeritorious "[i]f judgment goes
against the employer in the state court. . .or if his suit is withdrawn or is otherwise shown
to be without merit." Id. at 747. Thus, a reasonably based suit that proves to be unmeritori-
ous may be found to be an unfair labor practice, even though it could not have been en-
joined permanently. Id.
45. The Court also used the terms "baseless litigation" and a suit having "no basis" to
1985] 1243
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action is immunized by the first amendment petition right but a
baseless suit is not.46 Moreover, the state's interest in providing a
remedy for the breach of domestic peace is not implicated when
the suit has no basis because "by definition, the plaintiff in a base-
less suit has not suffered a legally protected injury. ' 47 Thus, the
Court concluded that the Board could prohibit the prosecution of a
baseless lawsuit brought with a retaliatory intent against an em-
ployee who was exercising rights protected by section 7 of the
Act.
48
Because a baseless suit initiated for retaliatory purposes con-
stitued a violation of the Act and could be enjoined,49 the Court
had to decide whether the Board and the lower court properly had
concluded that the employer's suit lacked a reasonable basis. The
petition for certiorari did not challenge the Board's factual find-
ings, which had been affirmed by the court of appeals. Instead, the
employer argued that the Board used an improper procedure for
determining whether its suit had a reasonable basis. The employer
contended that the Board should have limited its inquiry to the
four corners of the complaint. So long as the complaint stated a
claim for relief that the state court had jurisdiction to grant, the
Board could not enjoin the suit as an unfair labor practice. The
Board, however, claimed that the proper way to determine whether
a suit was baseless was to conduct a hearing on the merits of the
employer's state court claims, which the ALJ had done.50
The Court rejected both arguments. Instead, the Court con-
cluded that if a suit presents "a genuine issue of material fact"'" or
"genuine state-law legal questions, 52 the Board may not decide
whether an otherwise improperly motivated suit is an unfair labor
practice until after final judgment. The Court reasoned that the
first amendment and the state's interest in providing a remedy
precluded the Board from conducting a prejudgment hearing on
describe suits that may be enjoined as unfair labor practices. Id. at 743. A "groundless" suit
also may be enjoined. Id. at 746 n.12.
46. Id. at 743.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 744.
49. Id.
50. Id. After a four-day hearing, the AUJ concluded that "on the basis of the record
and from my observation of the witnesses, including their demeanor, and upon the extensive
briefs of the parties, [the employer] did not have a reasonable basis for the filing of its
lawsuit." 249 N.L.R.B. at 164.
51. 461 U.S. at 745.
52. Id. at 746. Genuine state-law legal questions involve claims that are governed only
by state law. See id.
1244 [Vol. 38:1235
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the merits of a suit that raised genuine factual issues or state law
questions.5
In an attempt to provide the Board with some guidance, the
Court discussed two hypothetical situations that loosely resembled
the facts of Bill Johnson's.4 In the first situation, the defendant in
a libel suit testified at an unfair labor practice hearing that an ac-
cusation of an employer's sexual advance contained in a leaflet dis-
tributed by picketing employees was true. The employer failed to
produce any evidence that the leaflet was maliciously false. The
Court advised that the Board could enjoin the suit permanently
because the employer had failed to establish "any genuine issues
for the state court to decide, and the inference that the suit is
groundless is too strong to ignore, in light of the strong federal pol-
icy against deterring the exercise of employees' collective rights." 55
The second hypothetical assumed that the employer testified
that he was elsewhere on the date of the alleged sexual incident. In
this situation, the Court counseled that Congress did not intend
for the Board to enjoin the libel suit permanently because the law-
suit's merit depended, at least in part, on the truth or falsity of the
employer's testimony.
56
After deciding those two hypothetical situations, the Court
53. The Court gave little guidance on how the Board is to decide whether a suit
presents genuine factual or legal issues: "[W]e leave the particular procedures for making
reasonable-basis determinations entirely to the Board's discretion . . . ." Id. at 745 n.11.
The Court did suggest, however, that the Board may want to turn to civil procedure juris-
prudence and seek guidance from the standards developed in motions for summary judg-
ment and directed verdict. Id. Furthermore, the Board need not stay its hand until the suit
has been concluded when "plainly unsupportable inferences from the undisputed facts and
patently erroneous submissions with respect to mixed questions of fact and law" are in-
volved. Id.
The Court did say, however, that the plaintiff has the burden of "present[ing] the
Board with evidence that shows his lawsuit raises genuine issues of material fact." Id. at
745-46. Once the plaintiff has met its burden, the Board immediately should stay the unfair
labor practice proceedings until the suit has been concluded. Id. The Court even implicitly
showed concern for the Board's caseload and stated that it "see[s] no reason why the Board
should want to hear all the employer's evidence in support of his state suit, or any more
than necessary, if it can be determined at an early stage that the case involves genuine
issues of material fact or law." Id. at 745 n.11.
54. See id. at 746 n.12.
55. Id. Analogizing to FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f), the Court suggested, however, that if the
plaintiff merely comes forward with an "acceptable explanation" of why it has no evidence
to support its suit, the suit may not be enjoined. 461 U.S. at 746 n.12.
56. 461 U.S. at 746 n.12. Additionally, the Court advised that the Board could not
enjoin a suit even though the facts are undisputed if a question of what inferences are to be
drawn from the undisputed facts exists, or a question of state law is involved. Id. at 745-46.
Similarly, the Board may not enjoin state court suits involving a mixed question of fact and
law. Id. at 746.
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turned to the case before it and concluded that "the only disputed
issues in the state lawsuit appear to be factual in nature. 57 Ac-
cording to the Court, the ALJ erred by making the factual deter-
mination, based on his evaluation of the evidence, that the em-
ployer's suit was groundless. Instead of weighing the evidence and
making credibility determinations, the ALJ should have limited his
inquiry to determining whether the employer introduced sufficient
evidence to raise genuine issues of material fact. Consequently, the
Court remanded the case to the Board for the purpose of making
this limited inquiry. The Court, however, never indicated which
hypothetical situation was more akin to Bill Johnson's suit.5 8
Additionally, the Court emphasized that in those situations in
which the Board must allow the suit to proceed, no unfair labor
practice is committed regardless of the plaintiff's motive for filing
the suit if the plaintiff ultimately prevails in state court.5 9 If, how-
ever, the plaintiff loses in state court, if the plaintiff withdraws the
suit, or if the suit is otherwise shown to be without merit, then the
Board may resume adjudication of the unfair labor practice case.60
An unfair labor practice finding after the plaintiff has withdrawn
or lost the suit does not run afoul of either the first amendment or
any compelling state interest. The plaintiff has had its day in court
and the interest of the state in providing a forum has been vindi-
cated.6 1 The Court further declared that the Board justifiably
could take the employer's failure to prevail into account in deter-
mining whether the employer had filed its suit in retaliation for
the employees' exercise of their collective bargaining rights.6 2
Finally, the Court noted that employees are not limited to
state law actions such as malicious prosecution if an unmeritorious
suit is brought with a retaliatory motive. 3 The Court declared that
the Board could award the defendants the attorneys' fees and ex-
penses incurred in defending the unmeritorious suit plus "any
57. Id.
58. See id. at 748. In a concluding footnote, the Court did attempt to apply its rulings
of law to the facts of the case before it. See id. at 749-50 n.15. First, the Court suggested
that, absent cogent reasons for not doing so, the Board should defer to the state court's
denial of summary judgment on the libel count. The Court then said that the Board could
reinstate its finding that the employer committed an unfair labor practice by filing and
prosecuting the claims that the state court dismissed. The dismissal of all claims except the
libel count was an adjudication that the claims were "lacking in merit." Id.




63. Id. at 747 n.14.
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other proper relief that would effectuate the policies of the Act." 4
Bill Johnson's thus establishes the rule that the Board must
find both a retaliatory motive and a lack of reasonable basis before
it can order an employer to cease prosecuting a lawsuit perma-
nently. In addition, the Board is prohibited from deciding genuine
issues of material fact or law in evaluating the basis of a lawsuit,
regardless of the employer's motive for filing the action. This stan-
dard will restrict the Board's ability to halt retaliatory suits per-
manently. The Court's opinion is silent, however, concerning the
Board's ability to enjoin a retaliatory suit temporarily when the
injunction is necessary to promote "the strong federal policy
against deterring the exercise of employees' collective rights." 5
This Article argues that the appropriate remedy would be the tem-
porary suspension of an employer's right to initiate a retaliatory
lawsuit during an organizational campaign. This remedy not only
would protect the individual and group rights of employees but
also would minimize the impingement of other countervailing
interests.
III. THE PROBLEM OF RETALIATORY SUITS DURING
ORGANIZATIONAL CAMPAIGNS AND A PROPOSED ACCOMMODATION
A. Two Alternative Remedies
The Bill Johnson's decision will curtail the Board's ability to
halt permanently lawsuits brought during a union-organizing drive
for the purpose of retaliating against employees who are engaging
in protected activities. Consequently, employers may resort to the
64. Id. at 747. State remedies such as malicious prosecution are not preempted by the
availability of federal remedies from the Board because both the state and the federal gov-
ernment have substantial interests to protect-the state's "interest in deterring the filing of
baseless litigation in its courts", id. at 747 n.14, and the federal government's "interests in
enforcing the federal labor law," id.
65. Id. at 746 n.12. The power of the Board to take remedial action short of a perma-
nent injunction was acknowledged expressly by Justice Brennan, however, in his concurring
opinion:
Thus, the Board retains broad power to deal with the ways in which resort to
judicial process may be used as a "powerful instrument of coercion or retaliation."...
The Board may not enjoin prosecution of an unpreempted state lawsuit unless it finds
that the suit has no reasonable basis, and it may not decide that a suit has no reasona-
ble basis in fact if a reasonable jury could view the facts differently. But it may take
other measures which have less direct impact on the plaintiff's First Amendment
rights, and it may investigate the matter to the full extent it deems necessary to vindi-
cate the federal interest in protecting participants in labor disputes from coercive
state-court lawsuits.
Id. at 755-56 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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courts for assistance in defeating an organizational campaign by
suing union supporters to discourage them and other employees
from taking an active role in the campaign. Unless the Board can
reduce the effectiveness of the retaliatory lawsuit tactic, the na-
tional policy of encouraging collective bargaining" will be
undercut.
An acceptable solution to the retaliatory suit problem must (1)
prevent employers from discouraging employee-organizing activi-
ties; (2) take into account the limited resources of employee-defen-
dants, the judiciary, and the Board; (3) recognize the right of em-
ployers to assert valid claims; and (4) be sensitive to the states'
interest in maintaining domestic peace. A basic goal of our system
of justice is to accord every individual possessing a meritorious
claim an opportunity to have that claim adjudicated . 7 This goal is
undermined if the Board can enjoin permanently all well-founded
retaliatory suits. On the other hand, it is the national labor policy
to promote worker collective activities by insulating them from
employer interference or coercion. 8 This policy is undermined if
employers are free to bring retaliatory suits during organizing cam-
paigns without fear of sanction as long as they raise a genuine issue
of fact or law. 9 Any solution must confront these conflicting
66. See supra note 13.
67. One may argue that a retaliatory lawsuit is not a petition for redress even though
the claims are well-founded. Instead, a retaliatory suit could be viewed as an act of spite
that should not be accorded constitutional protection even though the suit is meritorious.
The Bill Johnson's Court, however, appears to have rejected this view. See 461 U.S. at 740-
43.
68. Congress declared in the Act that employees have the right to self-organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). In § 8(a)(1) Con-
gress labeled as an unfair labor practice an employer's restraint or coercion of employees in
the exercise of § 7 rights. In addition, § 9(c)(1) authorizes the Board, under certain condi-
tions, to conduct representation elections and certify the results thereof. Finally, § 10 grants
the Board exclusive power to enforce the prohibitions of the Act.
69. The retaliatory suit tactic is not reserved exclusively for employers. Workers con-
fronted with retaliatory suits could respond with a countersuit of their own based on mali-
cious prosecution or abuse of process theories. This tactic is of little aid, however, to workers
lacking financial resources and experience in litigation. A counteraction by employee-defen-
dants does not preclude the assertion of retaliatory suits by employers and at best is only a
costly confrontation device available after the employee has incurred substantial litigation
expense. Indeed, it may be financially impossible for many employees to assert a counterac-
tion, although mitigation of this expense factor is possible if employees can retain lawyers
by offering a contingent fee. Moreover, the prospect of prolonged litigation may be undesir-
able to an individual whose original purpose was to organize her coworkers rather than to
engage in costly legal battles with her employer. Finally, widespread use of the "employee
counteraction" tactic ultimately would result in increased court congestion. A solution that




The Bill Johnson's Court authorized the Board to grant reim-
bursement for legal expenses incurred in defending a nonfrivolous,
retaliatory lawsuit in which the defendants ultimately prevail.70
This remedy is inadequate because it comes too late, focuses on
the wrong party in that it does nothing to remedy the injury to
group rights, and fails to deter further violations of employees' or-
ganizational rights. The remedy is designed only to reimburse em-
ployee-defendants for expenses incurred in defending a meritless
lawsuit. It does not rectify the injury to the organizational rights of
the defendants' fellow workers occasioned by the intimidation in-
herent in retaliatory suits. Moreover, reimbursement of legal ex-
penses is available only after substantial litigation. When asserted
against hourly workers of modest means with little litigation expe-
rience, pending retaliatory suits facilitate employee harassment by
instilling a fear of liability. To minimize this harassment and to
protect group organizational rights, the Board must create a rem-
edy that will protect workers during the most sensitive stages of an
organizational campaign.
7 1
In addition to reimbursement for legal expenses, one possible
remedy under current Board doctrine is to overturn an employer
victory in a union certification election if the employer filed a re-
taliatory suit during the union election campaign.72 Under the
Board's General Shoe73 doctrine, conduct that falls short of being
classified as an unfair labor practice nevertheless may be sufficient
grounds for overturning a representation election.74 Although the
economy.
70. 461 U.S. at 747.
71. See infra text accompanying note 76.
72. For a discussion of conduct that may invalidate an election under § 9, see L. Mo-
DJESKA, NLRB PRACTICE 232-42 (1983).
73. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
74. In General Shoe the Board declared:
Conduct that creates an atmosphere which renders improbable a free choice will some-
times warrant invalidating an election, even though that conduct may not constitute an
unfair labor practice ....
... [T]he criteria applied by the Board in a representation proceeding to deter-
mine whether certain alleged misconduct interfered with an election need [not] neces-
sarily be identical to those employed in testing whether an unfair labor practice was
committed. . .. In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a labora-
tory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as
possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees. It is our duty to estab-
lish those conditions; it is also our duty to determine whether they have been fulfilled.
When. . . the standard drops too low, because of our fault or that of others, the requi-
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Board has not faced the issue yet, under General Shoe the Board
may find that the pendency and prosecution of a suit during an
election campaign so taints the laboratory conditions in which the
election was conducted that the Board may overturn an employer
election victory even though the suit was meritorious and therefore
not an unfair labor practice under the Bill Johnson's rationale.
The overturning of election results has two major deficiencies
as a remedy for a retaliatory lawsuit. First, to the extent that the
first amendment protects the filing of a nonfrivolous, retaliatory
suit, serious constitutional questions arise if the Board is permit-
ted to penalize the employer's right to petition in this manner.
Second, this remedy is available only if the NLRB holds a union
certification election. An election petition usually can be filed,
however, only after at least thirty percent of the employees have
designated union support.7 5 Thus, if an employer can prevent
thirty percent of the employees from indicating union support, this
remedy is unavailable.
Furthermore, the employees are most vulnerable to employer
retaliation during the earliest stages of an organizing campaign.
When only two or three employees are sympathetic to an organiz-
ing effort, even the mildest employer reaction may be sufficient to
deter other employees from joining the organizing effort. There are
too few union sympathizers in the bargaining unit for the employ-
ees to feel a sense of solidarity or security in the numbers of simi-
larly situated coworkers. Because the most fragile period of an or-
ganizing drive is during the incipient stages, it usually is conducted
secretly.7 6 Consequently, overturning an employer's victory in a
representation election will not be an available remedy in those sit-
uations where it is needed most-where the retaliatory suit stymies
the organizational campaign before thirty percent of the employees
seek a union election.
site laboratory conditions are not present and the experiment must be conducted over
again.
Id. at 126-27 (footnotes omitted).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1984). The usual method for designating union support is sign-
ing an authorization card. See 29 C.F.R. § 101.17 (1984). Because of the Supreme Court's
decision in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), which authorized the issuance
of a bargaining order if a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit signed authoriza-
tion cards and the employer committed serious unfair labor practices during the course of
an election campaign, election petitions usually are not filed until more than half the em-
ployees have indicated their support for the union.
76. See J. BARBASH, THE PRACTICE OF UNIONISM 31-38, 42-44 (1956); 1. GrrELMAN,
UNIONIZATION ATTEMPTS IN SMALL ENTERPRISES: A GumE FOR EMPLOYERS 23-26 (1963).
1250 [Vol. 38:1235
RETALIATORY LAWSUITS
B. Costs and Benefits of Retaliatory Suits
Employers derive several benefits from suing the proponents
of an organizational campaign. By suing the individual employees,
the employer successfully demonstrates its economic power to the
workers and its willingness to use that power when challenged. A
retaliatory suit suppresses the union voice at the workplace by
causing the named defendants to cease organizing, or inhibiting
other employees from joining the organizing drive because they
fear they will be sued. This suppression occurs at a time when the
union voice would be most effective in organizing the employees
and may result in either aborting a union drive or helping the em-
ployer win a representational election.
The costs that might deter employer lawsuits, such as current
legal fees and a possible future reimbursement of defendant's legal
expenses, are relatively insignificant. Employers remain free to
utilize the substantial delays inherent in state court proceedings
and the intrusiveness of largely unmonitored discovery"8 to punish
union activists, to stifle their activities, and to frustrate the group
rights of other remaining employees.
C. Effect of Retaliatory Suits on Group Rights
A retaliatory lawsuit against a union activist directly affects
the rights of the group. A union voice may be silenced, thus re-
stricting the flow of union information among workers. Meanwhile,
the employer remains free to circulate its supervisors among the
workforce, campaigning for the employer and against the union.
Additionally, a climate of fear and intimidation spreads among the
workers. The employer's actions make it clear, either explicitly or
sub rosa, that anyone who campaigns for the union or who even
"talks union" will suffer the same fate as the defendant-em-
ployee-several years waiting for the state court machinery to
grind to a conclusion, frustration, depression, payment of legal
77. Reliance on reimbursement of the defendant's legal expenses is doubly insidious.
First, reimbursement does not make whole the defendants in retaliatory lawsuits who may
have had to borrow money or deprive their families to pay legal expenses. In a contested
case, the defendant's legal fees need not be reimbursed by the employer until the court of
appeals has reviewed the case and ordered enforcement of the Board's order. Second, reli-
ance on reimbursement of legal expenses focuses on the harm done to the defendant and
ignores the harm done to the remaining employees. This approach blatantly disregards the
employee group rights guaranteed by § 7 and thus destroys the very rights that § 10(c)
remedies were designed to protect. See infra note 79.
78. See generally Note, The NLRB's Discovery Practice, supra note 8 (discussion of
use of state court discovery procedures in unfair labor practice proceedings).
1985] 1251
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1235
fees, possible loss of home, and other undesirable consequences.
The remedy authorized in Bill Johnson's focuses on the individual
harm done to the defendant and ignores both the concept of group
rights inherent in section 779 and the effect of a retaliatory suit
against a union adherent during an organizational campaign.
Thus, any remedy must be aimed substantially at vindicating
group rights. It must attempt restoration of the group status quo
by reestablishing prounion information flows and dissipating the
employee intimidation caused by the retaliatory lawsuit. A remedy
designed to deter retaliatory suits by making them futile should
prevent such lawsuits.
D. Likely Characteristics of Retaliatory Suits
Although few reported cases concerning the retaliatory lawsuit
strategy by employers during union-organizing drives existed prior
to Bill Johnson's,80 the likely characteristics of future retaliatory
79. The employees' right to self-organization is a group right or a collective right. See
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the
NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1769, 1788-89 (1983) (arguing that reinstatement and backpay in
discriminatory discharge cases during an organizing campaign do not adequately protect the
group right to self-organization); Brousseau, Toward a Theory of Rights for the Employ-
ment Relation, 56 WASH. L. REv. 1, 19-27 (1980) (classifying employment rights as collective,
participatory or individual); Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEax L. REv. 1417, 1423 (1984)
(suggesting that certain § 7 rights are communal rights).
80. Only two reported cases prior to Bill Johnson's concerned a lawsuit brought by an
employer in bad faith during a union-organizing campaign. Clyde Taylor, 127 N.L.R.B. 103
(1960) (lawsuit to enjoin peaceful picketing that was part of a bad faith scheme to defeat
union organization was not an unfair labor practice); W.T. Carter & Brother, 90 N.L.R.B.
2020 (1950) (lawsuit to enjoin all union-organizing meetings on employer's property in a
company town was an unfair labor practice when employer's motivation in filing suit was to
frustrate the self-organization of the employees). In several reported cases, an employer
sued union supporters during an organizing campaign, but the Board made no finding of
bad faith. See, e.g., Mid-America Mach. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 537 (1978) (lawsuit to enjoin
picketing and seeking $50,000 in damages during an organizing campaign not an unfair labor
practice), enforced mem., 89 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 12,157 (7th Cir. 1979); S.E. Nichols Marcy
Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 75 (1977) (slander action seeking $50,000 during an organizing cam-
paign not an unfair labor practice).
The reported cases also contain instances in which an employer initiated a lawsuit for
the purpose of retaliating against an employee who filed an unfair labor practice charge with
the Board. See, e.g, United Credit Bureau of Am., Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 921 (1979) (employer's
fraud suit for $10,000 was a § 8(a)(4) unfair labor practice because it was fied to retaliate
against an employee for seeking redress from the Board), enforced, 643 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 994 (1981); George A. Angle, 242 N.L.R.B. 744 (1979) (employer's
malicious prosecution suit for $10,000 was a § 8(a)(4) unfair labor practice because the suit
lacked a reasonable basis and was intended to penalize an employee for utilizing the Board's
processes), enforced, 683 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1982); Power Sys., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 445
(1978) (employer's suit for legal fees incurred as a result of an unfair labor practice charge
by an employee was a § 8(a)(4) unfair labor practice because the suit had no "reasonable
1252
1985] RETALIATORY LAWSUITS 1253
suits may be hypothesized. First, the common law torts of defama-
tion, trespass, and wrongful interference with business are the
most likely theories of action.8 1 Second, the retaliatory suit proba-
bly would include a request for damages in the prayer for relief in
addition to requests for declaratory and injunctive relief.8 2 Third,
the likely targets of the suit would be individual workers who have
no union backing.8 3 Fourth, the suit probably would be initiated
during the incipient stages of an organizing drive before an elec-
tion petition could be filed . 4 Last, the retaliatory suit probably
would not be litigated to final judgment.8 5
basis" and had an "unlawful objective"), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979).
In Bill Johnson's the Board found that the employer's suit was filed not only for the pur-
pose of penalizing one employee for filing a charge with the Board but also to retaliate
against her and the other defendants for engaging in protected activity. 249 N.L.R.B. at 165.
Unions on occasion also have retaliated against those who have filed unfair labor prac-
tice charges against them by suing the charging party. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers'
Union Local 355, 254 N.L.R.B. 773 (1981) (union violated § 8(b)(1)(A) by suing an employee
for $30,000 because he filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board), aff'd in part and
vacated in part sub nom. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l As'n v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir.
1983).
The issues presented by lawsuits motivated by a desire to retaliate against employees
for filing charges with the Board are beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth noting,
however, that such suits seem to be worthy of even less first amendment protection than
suits brought to deter the exercise of self-organization rights, even though the Bill John-
son's Court did not draw this distinction. When an employee fies a charge with the Board
she is petitioning the government for redress of grievances within the meaning of the first
amendment. Consequently, Congress should have the power to prohibit the charged party
from using the judiciary to retaliate against the charging party for her exercise of her first
amendment petition right, particularly when the Board's enforcement machinery depends
entirely upon private individuals to file charges with it.
81. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983) (complaint con-
tained wrongful interference with business and libel counts); S.E. Nichols Marcy Corp., 229
N.L.R.B. 75 (1977) (complaint contained a slander count); W.T. Carter & Brother, 90
N.L.R.B. 2020 (1950) (complaint contained a trespass count).
82. Claims for both compensatory and punitive damages have ranged from $50,000,
see, e.g., Mid-America Mach. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 537 (1978), enforced mem., 89 Lab. Cas.
(CCH) 12,157 (7th Cir. 1979); S.E. Nichols Marcy Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 75 (1977), to
$500,000, see, e.g., Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 734 (seeking compensatory damages and
$500,000 in punitive damages), and conceivably could be much higher.
83. See, e.g., Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983); Mid-
America Mach. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 537 (1978) (claims against both individual employees and
union officials), enforced mem., 89 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 12,157 (7th Cir. 1979); S.E. Nichols
Marcy Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 75 (1977).
84. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 83.
85. The employer's conduct in Bill Johnson's is instructive. After successfully con-
testing the Board's power to enjoin its retaliatory lawsuit, the employer voluntarily with-
drew its suit. NLRB General Counsel's First Quarter, 1983, Report, 115 LAB. REL. RFP.
(BNA) 323, 323 (1984). The employer's lawsuit presumably had served its intended purpose
of thwarting the employees' organizing campaign. For a more complete description of the
subsequent history of the lawsuit, see Note, Reasonably Based, Unpreempted Lawsuits,
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E. Objectives and Consequences of Retaliatory Suits
The retaliatory suit strategy seeks to produce two results. The
immediate objective is to cause the organizers to cease organizing.
The second goal is to discourage future organizing attempts. A suit
seeking tens of thousands of dollars portends the possibility of
similar suits in future organizing drives and thus may inhibit work-
ers from bargaining collectively. Workers may desire to organize
their coworkers but may balk at the possibility of incurring liabil-
ity for thousands of dollars in the process.
The widespread use and success of the retaliatory suit tactic
could have far-reaching consequences. It is the national policy to
encourage collective bargaining. The viability of the NLRA de-
pends in large measure upon worker willingness to encourage fel-
low workers to join together for collective bargaining purposes. The
retaliatory suit technique conceivably could threaten to destroy
whatever equality exists in the organizational setting. The right to
engage in collective activity becomes a myth if an employer,
through the assertion of a retaliatory suit seeking substantial dam-
ages, effectively can force workers to cease organizing. The retalia-
tory suit tactic undermines a principal means of effectuating na-
tional policy because it discourages worker organization through
the threat of liability and litigation expense. As a result, organizing
efforts may be left exclusively to huge, financially sound unions,
rendering worker welfare a ward of distant union bosses.
The implications of the retaliatory suit tactic extend beyond
its chilling effect upon workers. The tactic wastes the judicial re-
sources necessary to supervise the filing of bad faith pleadings, to
set up pretrial conferences and discovery, and to conduct a formal
trial. With the workload of courts increasing at almost astronomi-
cal rates, the expenditure of judicial resources for any purpose
other than settling genuine disputes is especially odious.
There is one caveat to this indictment of retaliatory suits in
the union-organizing setting. Although the organizing efforts of
workers generally might be laudable, a possibility always exists
that organizers either intentionally or inadvertently will engage in
a course of conduct that will seriously and irreparably harm the
employer. Consequently, a retaliatory suit may be meritorious and
may be essential to the future viability of the employer. Any pro-
posed solution to the retaliatory suit problem must recognize and
supra note 8, at 974 n.119.
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preserve not only the first amendment interests of the employer
but its right to avoid irreparable harm.
The current remedy for retaliatory suits established in Bill
Johnson's is inadequate because it implicitly assumes that an em-
ployer has the right to sue employee-organizers during an organiza-
tional campaign. Such a premise finds its roots in the first amend-
ment petition clause. It simply is taken for granted that an
employer has total discretion in the timing of its suit. If in suing
an employee, an employer commits an unfair labor practice, then it
may be forced to reimburse the employee for her legal expenses
and to agree not to file another meritless, retaliatory suit. But it is
the filing of the suit that triggers the enforcement machinery. Ab-
sent an unfair labor practice, the Board has no power to act.
F. Proposed Accommodation for the Problem of Retaliatory
Suits
The ability to make the first move-to sue a union adher-
ent-lies at the heart of the problem. When an employer compares
the benefits of a suit to the costs, it simply has too tempting a
weapon in its hand. The current remedy for a meritless, retaliatory
suit focuses on minimizing the effect of the fired bullet, reassuring
the startled bystanders, and taking away the remaining ammuni-
tion. It does not focus on temporary disarmament. The current
remedy does not question the employer's discretion to control the
timing of a retaliatory suit.
The characteristics of such disarmament would be as follows.
First, it would be temporary. A temporary suspension of an em-
ployer's right to sue would last only during a "protected time,"
that is, only for the shortest of the following three periods:86
(1) until the union certification election were held, (2) until the
termination of the organizational campaign, or (3) until a fixed
86. An alternative way to measure the "protected time" would be to require the em-
ployees or the organizing union to file an "intent to organize" statement with the regional
office and the employer. This filing would insulate the employees from a retaliatory suit for
a fixed period of time after the filing of such a statement. This alternative, however, has at
least three drawbacks. First, it would provide no protection for employees prior to the filing
of the "intent to organize" statement. Second, in order to obtain protection from a retalia-
tory suit, the employees might be forced to announce their organizing drive at a less advan-
tageous time than they otherwise might choose. Third, although sophisticated union or-
ganizers who had the benefit and guidance of labor law counsel might not consider this filing
requirement to pose any problem, the requirement would provide no protection for those
most in need of protection-an employee-initiated organizing effort undertaken without the
assistance of an international union or labor law counsel.
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number of days from the time the employer first learned of the
organizational campaign. 7  Second, the temporary suspension
would bar only the right to initiate a retaliatory suit. Employers
still would be free to bring suits in good faith.8 Retaliatory motive
would be established using the Wright Line 9 test. The Board's
87. A fixed period of time is necessary to prevent employees from prolonging the orga-
nizational campaign until the statute of limitations has run, thereby cutting off the em-
ployer's right to file a retaliatory suit altogether. No scientific method exists for establishing
the proper length of this period. Instead, the Board must engage in a balancing of the em-
ployees' right to organize free of employer retaliation with the employers' right to petition.
Moreover, the Board must be certain that the fixed period is short enough that the statute
of limitations does not preclude a lawsuit entirely. The Board must rely on its experience in
setting the appropriate period. One hundred twenty days seems to be an appropriate maxi-
mum period. That time period would given the employees four months to organize their
coworkers without the fear of retaliatory lawsuits, and yet would be short enough to avoid
statute of limitations problems.
The process of arriving at the proper suspension period may be similar to the process
the Board experienced in establishing the starting date for the laboratory period in repre-
sentation election campaigns. In 1952, in Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1118
(1952), the Board established the starting date as either (1) the execution date of a consent-
election agreement, or (2) in contested cases, the issuance of a notice of hearing. Two years
later, in F.W. Woolworth Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1446 (1954), enforcement denied, 235 F.2d 319
(9th Cir. 1956), the Board moved the starting date in contested cases closer to the election
date, namely, to the date of "issuance of the decision and direction of election." 109
N.L.R.B. at 1448-49. In 1961 the Board reconsidered the starting date in the light of its
experience and overruled Woolworth. In Ideal Elec. & Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1275 (1961),
the Board held that the petition filing date rather than the direction of election date started
the laboratory period.
88. The characterization of a particular lawsuit as retaliatory or good faith rarely is an
easy task. Seldom will an employer expressly declare that its motive for suing is retaliatory.
The critical factual determination in these cases will be whether the employer's purpose in
filing the suit was to retaliate against the exercise of protected activities or whether the
employer merely sought redress for a wrong it believed was perpetrated against it. The state
of an employer's mind necessarily must be established by inferences drawn from circum-
stantial evidence.
The characterization of a lawsuit by the motivation of the plaintiff is a difficult task
because lawsuits may be motivated by a mixture of concerns. At one end of the continuum
are suits motivated purely by a desire to retaliate; at the opposite end are suits motivated
purely by a desire to seek redress for an alleged wrong. Those suits embodying varying
mixtures of motives lie in between. Distinguishing retaliatory suits from good faith suits is
critical if, as this Article proposes, treatment of the suits under the NLRA will differ. The
Board does possess some expertise in evaluating employer intent to determine the lawful-
ness of a particular act. See, e.g., Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980) (determining em-
ployer's motive for discharging an employee), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982).
89. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083 (1980), enforced, 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). In Wright Line the Board reformulated the allocation of
the burden of proof in cases in which the employee alleges that she was disciplined or dis-
charged because of her union activities and the employer asserts legitimate motives for its
decision. Under the Wright Line test, the General Counsel must persuade the Board that
antiunion sentiment influenced the employer's decision to discipline or discharge the em-
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General Counsel first would have to make a prima facie case that
retaliation was a motivating factor in the employer's decision to
sue.90 The employer then could rebut the General Counsel's evi-
dence of retaliation, or establish the affirmative defense that it
would have brought the suit regardless of the employee's organiza-
tional activities. 1 Third, only the plaintiff-employer's own employ-
ees would be entitled to this protection. Nonemployee organizers
are less vulnerable because their livelihood is not dependent on the
whims of the employer, and they have the support and resources of
the labor organization they represent.
A temporary suspension of the employer's right to sue, limited
to the relatively short time period of an organizational campaign,
would protect employees' section 7 rights at little cost to the em-
ployer. Employees' self-organization rights would be safeguarded
because an employer could not sue an employee with the purpose
of affecting an organizational campaign or representation election
ployee. Even if the employer is unable to meet or neutralize the General Counsel's prima
facie showing that protected conduct was a motivating factor in its decision, the employer
may establish the affirmative defense that the challenged action would have been taken
regardless of the protected conduct. Id. at 1088. The Supreme Court approved the Wright
Line test in § 8(a)(1) and (3) cases in NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S.
393, 395 (1983).
90. The General Counsel generally will not be able to produce direct evidence of the
employer's intent. Consequently, the General Counsel must rely on inferences from evidence
similar to that present in Bill Johnson's-employer threats, requests for exorbitant compen-
satory and punitive damages, the commission of other unfair labor practices, and the use of
unnamed John Doe and Jane Doe defendants. Additionally, the scope of employer discovery
may be powerful evidence of the employer's true intent. If the employer, for example, em-
barks upon a course of discovery similar to that in Bill Johnson's by conducting expedited
depositions seeking to discover the extent of organization, the names of union sympathizers,
and evidence that could be used in a pending unfair labor practice case, the Board may
decide that the employer's true purpose for suing was not to vindicate a legally protected
interest. The availability of the proposed remedy, therefore, may produce the salutary effect
of discouraging employers from using well-founded suits to gather information for use in
thwarting employee-organizing efforts.
91. In addition to the employer's causation defense, the Board could impose a further
limitation on the employee's right to temporary suspension. The Board could confine the
suspension of the right to bring retaliatory suits to those employers who have committed
other unfair labor practices during the organizing campaign. The availability of this exemp-
tion would deter employers from committing other types of unfair labor practices during a
campaign.
The availability of the affirmative defense aids in obviating constitutional objections to
the proposed remedy. See infra text accompanying notes 200-24. If the employer can show
that the suit is necessary to avoid irreparable injury or that it must proceed expeditiously in
order to assure recovery, then the Board will not suspend the prosecution of the suit be-
cause the employer presumably would be able to establish that it would have brought the
suit notwithstanding its retaliatory motive.
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during the "protected time." 92 Moreover, individual employees
would be protected from retaliatory suits not only during the cam-
paign but also afterwards. Once a campaign has ended and the
votes have been cast, the employer has little incentive to sue a
union adherent. Although a particularly vindictive employer might
sue a union adherent after an election, such suits are likely to be
few in number.
Thus, the accommodation proposed in this Article will not
permanently preclude an employer from initiating a retaliatory
suit. Instead, the right to sue merely will be suspended during the
earliest stages of an organizational campaign. Before assessing
whether this scheme to limit an employee's access to the judicial
process is sufficiently sensitive to the constitutional and state in-
terests at stake, it is instructive to trace the history of the Board's
efforts to regulate retaliatory lawsuits. This history reveals that to-
tal Board abdication is unsatisfactory in the long run and that the
Board and the courts can strike a balance that is consistent with
the Bill Johnson's opinion.
IV. THE BOARD'S REGULATION OF RETALIATORY SUITS: AN
EVOLUTION OF PRECEDENT
The Bill Johnson's Court correctly noted that the history of
the Board's regulation of retaliatory lawsuits has been "check-
ered. ' s3 Rather than explore the reasons for the Board's inconsis-
tent responses to retaliatory suits, the Court essentially ignored it.
A review of that history reveals that bright line rules have not
fared well in the regulation of retaliatory lawsuits. 94 The Board en-
countered repeated difficulty in applying a fixed standard to vari-
ous factual settings. Because of the competing interests at
stake-(1) the national labor policy of protecting employees' self-
organization rights, (2) the right to sue, and (3) the state's interest
92. The commencement of a retaliatory lawsuit against employee-organizers during
the "protected time" would be a § 8(a)(1) unfair labor practice. If such a suit were filed and
an unfair labor practice charge were lodged with the Board, the Board would issue a com-
plaint pursuant to § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982). If necessary, the Board is authorized
to petition a federal district court to enjoin temporarily an alleged unfair labor practice
upon issuance of a complaint. 29 U.S.C. § 160(0) (1982). Thus, under § 10(j) of the Act, the
Board may halt the employer's retaliatory suit temporarily until the Board has an opportu-
nity to hear the case and issue its order. Under this proposal, however, the employer would
be free to reactivate a nonfrivolous, retaliatory lawsuit at the conclusion of the protected
period.
93. 461 U.S. at 737.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 95-170.
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in providing a remedy to injured parties-it was inevitable that no
one accommodation of these interests would satisfy all situations.
The Bill Johnson's Court reached one accommodation. This Arti-
cle hypothesizes that employers will use retaliatory lawsuits to
thwart organizational campaigns and suggests a new accommoda-
tion that is sensitive to 811 three competing interests. The following
history of Board regulation of retaliatory lawsuits supports the
thesis that Bill Johnson's cannot be the final accommodation.
The legality of lawsuits and the Board's authority to issue a
cease-and-desist order to halt a pending suit generally have arisen
in three broad contexts:q5 (1) suits by employers during an organiz-
ing drive;"6 (2) suits by employers or unions against employees who
have filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board;97 and (3)
95. In addition to these three situations, the Board has considered whether an em-
ployer's lawsuit is an unfair labor practice in a variety of other contexts that defy general-
ization. See Peddie Bldgs., 203 N.L.R.B. 265 (1973) (trespass suit to enjoin peaceful picket-
ing was not an unfair labor practice, although a threat to cause the arrest of the picketers
for trespassing violated § 8(a)(1)); United Aircraft Corp., 192 N.L.R.B. 382 (1971) (employer
did not commit an unfair labor practice by threatening to sue a union for property damage
resulting from violence on a picket line unless the union withdrew its unfair labor practice
charges or by filing suit when the union did not withdraw its charges), modified, 534 F.2d
422 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Fashion Fair, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1435
(1966) (employer's suit to enjoin picketing by discharged employees was not an unfair labor
practice); Texas Foundries, Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 1642, 1689 (1952) (employer's suit to enjoin
picketing was not an unfair labor practice because the suit was not brought "maliciously,
abusively, and in bad faith"); Atlanta Metallic Casket Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1225 (1950) (em-
ployer's recourse to court proceedings was inextricably a part of the employer's unlawful
refusal to bargain and the Board ordered the suit to be withdrawn even though the Board
declined to consider whether the suit constituted an independent unfair labor practice).
96. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 155 (1980); Mid-America Mach. Co.,
238 N.L.R.B. 537 (1978) (suit to enjoin picketing during an organizing campaign and to
recover $50,000 in alleged damages was not an unfair labor practice); S.E. Nichols Marcy
Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 75 (1977) (the filing of a civil suit seeking $50,000 in alleged damages
during an organizing campaign was not an unfair labor practice); Clyde Taylor Co., 127
N.L.R.B. 103 (1960) (obtaining court injunction banning peaceful picketing as part of a bad
faith scheme to defeat union organization was not an unfair labor practice); W.T. Carter &
Brother, 90 N.L.R.B. 2020 (1950) (securing court order to prevent union meetings in a com-
pany town during an organizing campaign was an unfair labor practice).
97. Since 1978 the Board consistently has held that an employer or union who sues an
employee for filing charges with the Board is guilty of violating the Act. In each of these
cases, the Board found that the suit was retaliatory and lacked a reasonable basis. Sheet
Metal Workers' Union Local 355, 254 N.L.R.B. 773, 778-80 (1981) (union's lawsuit seeking
$30,000 in damages against a former union member was an unfair labor practice because the
union's objective was unlawfully to penalize the former union member for filing a charge
with the Board, thus depriving him of, and discouraging employees from, seeking access to
the Board processes); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 155 (1980); United
Credit Bureau of Am., Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 921, 925-26 (1979) (employer's fraud action seek-
ing $10,000 in damages against ar4 employee was an unfair labor practice because it was filed
purely for purposes of retaliation to punish the employee for seeking redress from the Board
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suits by unions.9 In terms of motive and claim substantiality, all
and to discourage other employees from seeking to enforce their rights), enforced, 643 F.2d
1017 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 994 (1981); George A. Angle, 242 N.L.R.B. 744 (1979)
(employer's lawsuit for malicious prosecution against an employee seeking compensatory
damages of $10,000 was an unfair labor practice because it was aimed at penalizing the
employee for utilizing the Board's processes), enforced, 683 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1982);
Power Sys., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 445, 449-50 (1978) (employer violated § 8(a)(4) by filing an
action for wrongful use of civil proceedings seeking more than $7,000 in damages against an
employee who had filed an unmeritorious unfair labor practice claim against the employer
because the employer's objective was unlawfully to penalize the employee for filing a charge
with the Board), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979).
98. The union-plaintiff cases can b; broken down into four categories: (1) suits to en-
force a contract provision that violates the § 8(e) proscription of any contract whereby an
employer agrees not to handle products of, or agrees to cease doing business with, any other
person; (2) suits to enforce a disciplinary fine imposed upon an employee who has resigned
from the union before engaging in the conduct for which the discipline was imposed; (3)
suits to enforce a union-security clause that violates the union-security proviso of § 8(a)(3);
and (4) suits prohibited by § 8(b)(1)(B) for seeking enforcement of a contract providing for
grievance-adjustment representatives not of the employer's own choosing.
The Board consistently has held that a good faith suit claiming rights pursuant to a
contract provision prohibited by § 8(e) is not an unfair labor practice. International Union
of Operating Eng'rs, Local 12, 220 N.L.R.B. 530 (1975) (absent bad faith, lawsuit to enforce
a contract interpretation prohibited by § 8(e) was not an unfair labor practice even though
the suit sought $31,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages); Retail
Clerks Union Local 770, 218 N.L.R.B. 680 (1975) (suit to enforce arbitrator's award enforc-
ing a contract clause prohibited by § 8(e) was in good faith to enforce a colorable contrac-
tual right and, therefore, was not an unfair labor practice); see Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 217 N.L.R.B. 946 (1975) (suit seeking $250,000 in damages wholly unrelated
to any actual loss for breach of a valid § 8(e) construction industry proviso clause did not
violate 8(b)(4)(B)(ii)).
The Board generally has held that union suits enforcing a disciplinary fine violative of §
8(b)(1)(A) because the fine was imposed upon an employee who resigned from the union
before engaging in the conduct for which the discipline was imposed were an unfair labor
practice. E.g., Booster Lodge No. 405, 185 N.L.R.B. 380 (1970) (suit to enforce a disciplinary
fine imposed upon an employee who had resigned before engaging in the conduct for which
the discipline was imposed "restrains" or "coerces" the employee within the meaning of §
8(b)(1)(A)). Contra Local 283, UAW, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1121 (1964) (union suit to collect a
fine was not an unfair labor practice "quite apart from, and without regard to whether, the
assessment of the fine itself would violate 8(b)(1)(A)").
Union lawsuits to compel employees to become union members pursuant to an unlawful
union-security clause or pursuant to the unlawful construction of a valid union-security
clause have been held to be § 8(b)(1)(A) unfair labor practices. E.g., United Stanford Em-
ployees, Local 680, 232 N.L.R.B. 326 (1977) (suit for breach of contract against employees
violated § 8(b)(1)(A) because the suit was filed in pursuit of the unlawful objective of com-
pelling employees to become union members); Television Wis., Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 722 (1976)
(union's suit for $150,000 to enforce an unlawful union-security clause violated § 8(b)(1)(A)
not because of the union's subjective intent but because of the union's unlawful objective);
see United Food Workers, District 227, 247 N.L.R.B. 195 (1980) (union's suit against the
employer to compel arbitration violated § 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) when the union's motivation
was to penalize an employee). But see American Bakery Workers, Local 173, 128 N.L.R.B.
937 (1960) (Board did not rely on the union's lawsuit to enforce a valid union-security con-
tract clause when it found that the union violated § 8(b)(2) in attempting to cause the
discharge of an employee).
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the lawsuits can be classified within one of four categories: 99 (1) re-
taliatory and frivolous; (2) retaliatory and nonfrivolous;
(3) nonretaliatory and frivolous; and (4) nonretaliatory and non-
frivolous. Only the fourth category has been treated consistently
by the Board. The Board never has found a nonfrivolous suit initi-
ated without a retaliatory motive to be an unfair labor practice.
The Board's response to the other three categories of lawsuits,
however, has varied. The Board initially held in W.T. Carter &
Brother'"0 that a lawsuit brought with a retaliatory motive could
be an unfair labor practice and that the Board could halt the pros-
ecution of the suit, regardless of the substantiality of the claims.
Ten years later the pendulum swung in the other direction. The
Board decided in Clyde Taylor'01 that it must accommodate the
employer's right to sue and concluded that it had no authority to
halt the prosecution of a lawsuit, irrespective of the motive or basis
for the suit. In the years immediately preceding the Supreme
Court's decision in Bill Johnson's, the Board retreated from its po-
sition that the filing of a lawsuit could not be an unfair labor prac-
tice, and held in some instances that baseless suits filed with a re-
taliatory motive could be enjoined.
10 2
The first case that raised the issue whether a lawsuit could be
an unfair labor practice was W.T. Carter & Brother.'°0 In Carter
The Board has held that union suits to compel an employer to use grievance-adjust-
ment representatives who were not of the employer's own choosing were § 8(b)(1)(B) unfair
labor practices. E.g., International Org. of Masters, 224 N.L.R.B. 1626 (1976) (suit to compel
employer to designate its grievance-adjustment representatives in accordance with a con-
tract to which the employer was not a party violated § 8(b)(1)(B)), enforced, 575 F.2d 896
(D.C. Cir. 1978); see Iron Workers Local 75, 268 N.L.R.B. 1453 (1984) (General Counsel
failed to prove that union's lawsuit sought to enforce a contract clause that would have
designated the employer's representatives for collective bargaining).
99. See supra note 10.
100. 90 N.L.R.B. 2020, 2023-24 (1950).
101. 127 N.L.R.B. 103, 109 (1960).
102. E.g., Sheet Metal Workers' Union Local 355, 254 N.L.R.B. 773, 778-80 (1981);
Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 155 (1980); United Credit Bureau of Am.,
Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 921, 925-26 (1979), enforced, 643 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 994 (1981); George A. Angle, 242 N.L.R.B. 744 (1979), enforced, 683 F.2d 1296 (10th
Cir. 1982); Power Sys., Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 445, 449-50 (1978), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d
936 (7th Cir. 1979); United Stanford Employees, Local 680, 232 N.L.R.B. 326, 327 (1977);
International Org. of Masters, 224 N.L.R.B. 1626 (1976), enforced, 575 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Television Wis., Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 722 (1976).
103. 90 N.L.R.B. 2020 (1950), discussed in Recent Cases, Securing Injunction from
State Court Held Unfair Labor Practice, 64 HARV. L. REV. 507 (1951). A Board case prior to
Carter entailed an injunction suit by an employer against a union and several of its officers
and members. Although the Board held that the employer did not commit an unfair labor
practice when he "summoned to his office those defendants who were employees of the re-
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the employer engaged in a "policy of absolute exclusion" 104 to pre-
vent union organizers from holding open air meetings in a com-
pany town.
105
The employer eventually filed suit in state court and obtained
an ex parte temporary restraining order prohibiting union meet-
ings without the employer's consent and had the organizers ar-
rested for violating the court's order.106 In a two-to-one decision,
the Board held that the employer's refusal to permit the holding of
outdoor union meetings in the company town and all the means
used to prevent such meetings, including the prosecution of the
lawsuit, violated section 8(a)(1).-07
The Board recognized that the right to resort to court pro-
ceedings was a "basic right"'' 08 but concluded that the right was
not absolute. Instead, it was limited by doctrines such as the law of
malicious prosecution and wrongful initiation of civil proceed-
ings. 09 Because the employer in Carter filed suit "for the purpose
of preventing [its] employees from exercising their rights under the
Act, rather than for the purpose of advancing any legitimate inter-
est of [its] own," 1 0 the Board held that the initiation and prosecu-
spondent, and berated them for certain derogatory statements concerning him which they
had made in their answer [to the complaint]," there was no discussion whether initiation of
the suit was an unfair labor practice. Se-Ling Hosiery Mills, Inc., 14 N.L.R.B. 485, 488
(1939).
104. 90 N.L.R.B. at 2022.
105. Id. The employer had the organizers arrested when they attempted to hold an
open meeting in the company town, restricted the organizers to broadcasting over a loud-
speaker as they drove through the public streets, followed the organizers as they drove, and
had the organizers arrested for driving off a dirt road while making a turn. Id. at 2021-22.
106. Id. at 2021-22.
107. Id. at 2022.
108. Id. at 2023.
109. The Board emphasized that the law of malicious prosecution and wrongful initia-
tion of civil proceedings "establishes the broad principle that there is an abuse of legal pro-
cess when such process is invoked in bad faith." Id. at 2024.
The Board's statement of the law of malicious prosecution and wrongful initiation of
civil proceedings was somewhat flawed in that such actions required a showing that the
earlier suit was brought (1) without probable cause and (2) primarily for a purpose other
than that of adjudicating a claim. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 119,
120 (4th ed. 1971). Neither of these requisites was present in Carter because the employer
wished to assert what it apparently thought was an owner's right to exclude unwanted per-
sons, regardless of motive. This misstatement of the law does not deprive Carter of its au-
thority, however, because the Board referred to the law of malicious prosecution merely to
point out that the "right of a person to resort to the courts is not absolute." 90 N.L.R.B. at
2023-24. In Carter the Board created another limitation on the right to resort to the courts
when an employer filed a lawsuit to prevent employees from exercising their statutory
rights.
110. 90 N.L.R.B. at 2024.
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tion of the suit was an unfair labor practice."' The employer was
ordered to request the state court to vacate the outstanding in-
junction prohibiting union meetings on the employer's property
without the employer's consent. In essence, the Carter Board held
that a lawsuit brought with a retaliatory motive was an unfair la-
bor practice, regardless of the merits of the underlying suit.1 2 In
his dissent, Chairman Herzog agreed that the employer's motive in
initiating its lawsuit was to interfere with its employees' right to
organize. Nevertheless, he believed that the "Board should accom-
modate its enforcement of the statute to the traditional right of all
to bring their contentions to the attention of a judicial forum,
rather than hold it to be an unfair labor practice for them to at-
tempt to do so.""'
After Carter the Board found an unfair labor practice and or-
dered appropriate relief when the employer's resort to the courts
demonstrated that it had adopted a policy of absolute refusal to
bargain with a union. In Atlanta Metallic Casket Co."4 the Board
found that the employer's instigation of a lawsuit in federal district
court challenging the Board approved representation election and
certification of the union, which followed repeated refusals to bar-
gain and other dilatory conduct, was "inextricably a part of the
[employer's] unlawful refusal to bargain. '" 5 Accordingly, the
Board found that the employer's actions "were motivated not by a
good faith desire to seek the adjudication of its legitimate inter-
ests,""' but by a desire "to delay the performance of its obliga-
111. Id. The Board expressly declared that the employer's lawsuit was an unfair labor
practice solely because the employer was "motivated by a desire to stop the union organiza-
tion of [its] employees rather than by any bona fide concern to protect [its] property." Id. at
2023.
112. The state court apparently determined, at least preliminarily, that the employer's
suit was meritorious. After a hearing, the state court converted the restraining order into a
temporary injunction, which the defendants did not appeal. Id. at 2022. The Board did not
comment directly on the merits of the lawsuit, although its citation of Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), and NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949),
could suggest that the Board was of the opinion that the employer's trespass suit was not
meritorious. 90 N.L.R.B. at 2023 n.11.
The Board ordered the employer to request the state court to vacate the injunction. 90
N.L.R.B. at 2028. The employer also was ordered to cease and desist from resorting to court
proceedings to prevent the holding of outdoor union meetings in the company town. Id. at
2027.
113. 90 N.L.R.B. at 2029. Chairman Herzog did not indicate the source or derivation
of this "traditional right." See infra text accompanying notes 171-99.
114. 91 N.L.R.B. 1225 (1950).
115. Id. at 1235 n.24.
116. Id. at 1235-36.
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tions under the Act and to deny its employees their guaranteed
right to be represented for the purposes of collective bargaining by
an agent of their own choosing. '
Prior to the Board's shift in its treatment of employer lawsuits
in the 1960 Clyde Taylor"' decision, the only other reported
Board case involving the legality of the initiation of a lawsuit con-
cerned a nonretaliatory and nonfrivolous suit. In Texas Foundries,
Inc.,'" the Board adopted the trial examiner's decision that an
employer's lawsuit to enjoin picketing was not an unfair labor
practice because it was brought with probable cause12 0 and in good
faith. In 1955 the Board signaled a possible shift in its thinking. In
an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Amalgamated Clothing
Workers v. Richman Brothers,'" the Board argued that Carter was
"limited to situations in which the employer's resort to the state
court [was] part of a bad faith scheme to defeat union
organization.'
' 22
In Clyde Taylor,22 however, the Board rejected even the lim-
ited reading of Carter set forth in its Amalgamated Clothing ami-
cus brief and overruled Carter entirely. The employer in Clyde
Taylor discharged five employees, in violation of section 8(a)(3),24
because of their union activities. After the discharged employees
117. Id. The Board reasoned that it was unnecessary to determine whether the instiga-
tion of court proceedings in and of itself constituted an independent violation of § 8(a)(1)
because the employer was ordered to cease its unfair labor practices and to take all steps
necessary to remedy the effects thereof. Id. at 1235 n.24. Because "recourse to court pro-
ceedings constituted one of the means whereby [the employer] sought to avoid the duties
imposed on it by Section 8(a)(5)," the Board's remedy presumably required the employer to
withdraw its lawsuit contesting the Board approved representation election. Id. Atlanta Me-
tallic Casket involved a retaliatory and frivolous suit because the employer brought the case
in bad faith and it lacked a reasonable basis.
118. 127 N.L.R.B. 103 (1960); see infra text accompanying notes 123-29.
119. 101 N.L.R.B. 1642 (1952).
120. In light of the Carter holding that a retaliatory suit was an unfair labor practice
regardless of whether the plaintiff had probable cause to bring the suit, it is not clear why
the Board in Texas Foundries considered the employer's basis for bringing the suit. The
Board's consideration in Texas Foundries of the basis for the suit lends itself to two possi-
ble inferences: (1) that well-founded suits, even though retaliatory, would not be unfair la-
bor practices, or (2) that good faith suits lacking probable cause would be violative of the
Act. Nothing in the Board's opinion indicates which reading of Texas Foundries is more
accurate.
121. 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
122. Id. at 520 n.6.
123. 127 N.L.R.B. 103 (1960).
124. Section 8(a)(3) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of em-
ployment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .... ." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
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filed unfair labor practice charges with the Board, the employer
threatened to sue them for libel unless they withdrew the charges.
When the union that sought to organize the employer's workers
began picketing peacefully in protest against the discriminatory
discharges, the employer filed a lawsuit in state court and obtained
an injunction banning the peaceful picketing. The trial examiner
found that the employer's resort to court proceedings was part of a
bad faith scheme to defeat union organization and that it thus vio-
lated section 8(a)(1) under the Carter doctrine.'2
5
The Board reversed the trial examiner without discussing the
findings that the suit was without merit and was initiated with a
retaliatory motive. The majority in Clyde Taylor adopted the dis-
senting view in Carter "that the Board should accommodate its
enforcement of the Act to the right of all persons to litigate their
claims in court, rather than condemn the exercise of such right as
an unfair labor practice."'21 6 Because the majority failed even to
refer to the merits of or motivation for the employer's suit, Clyde
Taylor appears to stand for the proposition that under no circum-
stances could the commencement and prosecution of a lawsuit
amount to an unfair labor practice. 27 The Board appeared to take
the position that it should abandon enforcement of the Act when-
ever coercive conduct took place under the aegis of litigation.
Although the Clyde Taylor Board held that the exercise of the
right to litigate should not be condemned as an unfair labor prac-
tice, the Board unanimously held that the employer's threat to sue
discharged employees for libel after they filed unfair labor practice
125. 127 N.L.R.B. at 120-21. Specifically, the trial examiner found (1) that the lawsuit
was unmeritorious because the subject matter of the suit was entirely within the area in
which state jurisdiction had been wholly preempted by the Act, id. at 119-20, and (2) that
the employer's suit was motivated by a desire to prevent its employees from exercising their
statutory right rather than to advance any legitimate interest of its own, id. at 121.
126. Id. at 109.
127. Member Fanning's concurring opinion agreed with the majority, who reversed the
trial examiner's finding of an unfair labor practice. However, he disagreed with the overrul-
ing of Carter. Fanning did not believe that the employer's motivation for suing in Clyde
Taylor was to defeat union organization of its employees rather than to protect a legitimate
interest of the employer even though the suit was baseless because the subject matter of the
suit was preempted. Fanning distinguished Carter on the ground that the evidence of the
employer's retaliatory motive was stronger in Carter because the underlying unfair labor
practices were "more pervasive" in Carter and bore a "closer relationship" to the employer's
lawsuit. 127 N.L.R.B. at 109-10 (Fanning, Member, concurring). Thus, in Member Fanning's
view, Carter was limited to situations in which the employer's retaliatory motive was mani-
fested by highly pervasive underlying unfair labor practices and the lawsuit was closely re-
lated to the underlying unfair labor practices.
19851 1265
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1235
charges did violate the Act.12s The Board explained its holding as
follows:
[W]e do not mean to deny the existence of the normal right of all persons to
resort to the civil courts to obtain an adjudication of their claims. We inter-
dict here only the making of a threat by an employer to resort to the civil
courts as a tactic calculated to restrain employees in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the Act.129
The accommodation reached by the Clyde Taylor Board, there-
fore, was that an employer could not threaten to sue its employees,
but that it could carry out the threat.
The Board followed Clyde Taylor strictly for several years. It
refused to find that any lawsuit initiated by an employer or by a
union violated the Act, regardless of the motive or substantiality of
the claim. In Local 283, UAW,' for example, the Board held that
a union's suit to collect a fine did not violate the Act "for reasons
quite apart from, and without regard to whether, the assessment of
the fine itself would [be an unfair labor practice]."'' Similarly, in
Fashion Fair, Inc.,i3 2 the Board affirmed the trial examiner's hold-
ing that a lawsuit to enjoin employee picketing was not an unfair
labor practice even though the suit had no legal basis under Indi-
ana law and the employer was "essentially motivated by [its] con-
tinuing aversion to the Union and by a desire to harass the picket-
ers in the exercise of their protected concerted activities."'' 3
In cases concerning lawsuits by employers, the Board contin-
ued to apply Clyde Taylor strictly until 1978.13 In cases concern-
128. 127 N.L.R.B. at 108.
129. Id. Of course, an employer could use an actual suit as a "tactic calculated to
restrain employees" in the exercise of their rights as successfully as it could use a threat of a
suit. The Board offered no explanation for this distinction between the filing of a suit and
the threat of a suit except its reference to the "normal right of all persons to resort to the
civil courts to obtain an adjudication of their claims." Id. The Board failed to explain the
source of this "normal right" or why this "right" should be paramount to the § 7 rights of
workers in all circumstances. These inconsistencies and weaknesses in the Clyde Taylor de-
cision aided the gradual process by which the Clyde Taylor doctrine was eroded without
actually being overruled. See infra text accompanying notes 159-60.
130. 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964), enforced, 393 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1968), aff'd sub nom.
Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
131. 145 N.L.R.B. at 1121.
132. 159 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1966).
133. Id. at 1449. Clyde Taylor also was relied upon to protect the employer's
photographing of picketers for the purpose of obtaining evidence to support the employer's
retaliatory lawsuit. Id. at 1450 n.36.
134. See DC Int'l, Inc. 162 N.L.R.B. 1383, 1394, enforcement denied, 385 F.2d 215
(8th Cir. 1967); G.C. Murphy Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 370, 377 (1968), afl'd sub nom. Food Store
Employees Union, Local 347 v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United Aircraft Corp.,
192 N.L.R.B. 382, 384 (1971), modified, 534 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1975); Frank Visceglia, 203
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ing the imposition and attempted enforcement of fines by unions
against members who had resigned from the union and crossed
picket lines during strikes, however, the Board departed from its
liberal attitude toward litigation as early as 1970. The Board-with
the ultimate approval of the Supreme Court-found that because
the fines themselves were illegal, attempts to enforce the fines in
court also were illegal. 135 When it prohibited these nonretaliatory
lawsuits,"s the Board did not consider the applicability of Clyde
Taylor or refer to its apparently contrary position in Local 283,
UAW 37 that a union's suit to collect a fine did not violate the Act,
regardless of the lawfulness of the fine.
The Board originally refused to extend the rationale of the
union fine cases to other types of cases. Thus, the Board held that
union lawsuits initiated to enforce contract provisions violative of
section 8(e)1 38 were not independent unfair labor practices.13 9 The
N.L.R.B. 265, 272 (1973), enforcement denied, 498 F.2d 43 (3d Cir. 1974); San Clemente
Gen. Hosp., 224 N.L.R.B. 378, 380 (1976); S.E. Nichols Marcy Corp., 229 N.L.R.B. 75, 75 n.2
(1977); Mid-America Mach. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 537, 546-47 (1978), enforced mem., 89 Lab.
Cas. (CCH) 1 12,157 (7th Cir. 1980).
135. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Local 1029, 187 N.L.R.B. 636 (1970),
enforcement denied, 446 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), rev'd, 409 U.S. 213 (1972); Booster Lodge
No. 405, 185 N.L.R.B. 380 (1970), enforced in relevant part, 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
aff'd sub nom. NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
136. The lawsuits prohibited in Granite State and Booster Lodge are best character-
ized as nonretaliatory because nothing in the opinions suggests that the unions' lawsuits
were motivated by anything but a good faith desire to enforce disciplinary fines that the
unions genuinely believed were lawful. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S., 175
(1967) (the union did not violate the Act by seeking judicial enforcement of a fine imposed
on a member who had engaged in strikebreaking activities). The suits in Granite State and
Booster Lodge were not well-founded, however, because the fines were found to be unlawful
and therefore unenforceable.
137. 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964), enforced, 393 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1968), aff'd sub nom.
Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969); see supra text accompanying notes 130-31.
138. Section 8(e) provides, in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases
or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or
otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing busi-
ness with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or
hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible [sic] and
void ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982).
139. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 12, 220 N.L.R.B. 530 (1975); Re-
tail Clerks Union Local 770, 218 N.L.R.B. 680 (1975). Both cases involved lawsuits brought
in good faith but that were not well-founded because an unlawful contract clause was
unenforceable.
In Retail Clerks the union believed that the employer was violating a contract clause
and submitted the matter to an arbitrator who agreed with the union and ordered the em-
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Board found that such suits were brought "in good faith to enforce
a colorable contract right"14 and expressly distinguished the union
fine cases.' 4 '
The gradual modification of the Clyde Taylor doctrine that
began with the union fine cases became more pronounced in Tele-
vision Wisconsin, Inc..42 In Television Wisconsin the union sued
ten members who had resigned prior to a strike, worked during the
strike, and circulated decertification petitions. The union alleged
that by these actions the employees had violated both the union-
security clause of their contract and their obligations as members.
The union also claimed that the employees had conspired with the
employer to undermine the union. 143
ployer to abide by the contract clause. When the employer failed to comply with the arbitra-
tor's award, the union filed a lawsuit to confirm the award. The employer then filed a charge
against the union asserting that the contract clause violated § 8(e) and that the union's
lawsuit to enforce the arbitration award was an unfair labor practice. The Board held that
the contract clause did violate § 8(e), but concluded that the union's lawsuit was not an
unfair labor practice because the union's "conduct in resorting to the courts to confirm the
arbitrator's award was done in good faith to enforce a colorable contract right and was not
the kind of tactic calculated to restrain employees or employers in the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the Act." 218 N.L.R.B. at 683.
140. Retail Clerks, 218 N.L.R.B. at 683.
141. The Board concluded:
[The union fine cases] are significantly distinguishable from the instant situation. The
vice in collecting a fine by means of a lawsuit is manifestly not independent of the
illegality of the fine and its imposition. The illegality lies not in the lawsuit to collect
the fine but in the union's act of imposing the illegal fine. In other words, but for the
imposition of the illegal fine there would be no unfair labor practice and no lawsuit.
This is not the situation in the instant case. Here, absent the lawsuit, there would be
no unfair labor practice. The lawsuit in effect is the unfair labor practice.
International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 12, 220 N.L.R.B. 530, 538 (1975). In IUE
the Board held that, absent bad faith, a union's lawsuit to enforce an unlawful interpreta-
tion of a contract is not an unfair labor practice because the merit of the union's lawsuit "is
a matter for the court and is not relevant in deciding whether the act of bringing the suit
constitutes impermissible restraint or coercion." Id. at 538-39.
142. 224 N.L.R.B. 722 (1976). It is unclear from the ALJ's opinion whether the lawsuit
at issue in Television Wisconsin was a retaliatory suit. On the one hand, the ALJ found that
the union's purpose was to coerce and restrain the defendants in their exercise of protected
activity. On the other hand, the ALJ found "no evidence from which to conclude that the
action was conceived or brought in malice or bad faith." Id. at 779. This ambiguity was
rendered moot, however, by the Board's position that the lawsuit was an unfair labor prac-
tice "not because of the Union's subjective intent but because of the unlawful objective
sought by the Union." Id. at 722 n.2 (footnote to Board's "Decision and Order"). Hayward
Baker Co., 275 N.L.R.B. No. 48, [1985-86 Transfer Binder] NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1 17,277
(Apr. 26, 1985), overruled Television Wisconsin's denial of the reimbursement of legal ex-
penses incurred by employees in defending against a union's retaliatory lawsuit. The
Board's decision in Hayward Baker Co. does not alter the significance of Television Wiscon-
sin for the purposes of this Article.
143. 224 N.L.R.B. at 779.
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The ALJ found that the filing of this suit violated the Act.
The ALJ construed the union fine cases and the Retail Clerks case,
in which the Board had held that a lawsuit brought in good faith
to enforce a colorable contract right was not an unfair labor prac-
tice,' 4 as adopting an intent test.145 Because the ALJ found that
the union's purpose in suing was to coerce and restrain the em-
ployee-defendants in the exercise of their statutory rights, he con-
cluded that the union's resort to court proceedings was an inde-
pendent unfair labor practice.146 Although the Board affirmed the
ALJ's findings, in an influential but ambiguous footnote it stated
that it did so "not because of the Union's subjective intent but
because of the unlawful objective sought by the Union.' 1 47 The
Board thus rejected the ALJ's view that Retail Clerks adopted an
intent test and apparently adopted its own view that the suit was
illegal because its objective was the enforcement of an illegal
union-security clause. The Board made no attempt to distinguish
its holding in Retail Clerks that a suit brought "in good faith to
enforce a colorable contract right" does not violate the Act.'48 Nor
did the Board explain why a contract clause that violates section
8(e) is a "colorable contract right" even though a contract clause
that violates section 8(b)(1)(A) is not.
49
The Board thus extended the rationale of the union fine cases
to make an exception to Clyde Taylor when the suit has an "un-
lawful objective. ' 150 In rejecting an intent test, however, the Board
in Television Wisconsin indicated that it was distinguishing a suit
to enforce an illegal fine or contract clause (unlawful objective)
from a suit "to restrain and coerce [employees] . . .in the exercise
of their rights"'' (wrongful subjective intent, but not a basis for
144. See supra note 139.
145. According to the ALJ, "the rationale of the Retail Clerks case indicates that de-
spite reliance on [Clyde] Taylor therein intent has become determinative." 224 N.L.R.B. at
780. Although the ALJ expressly found that the union's suit was not brought maliciously or
in bad faith, he also found that the union's purpose for suing was to enforce an unlawful
union-security clause and to restrain and coerce the defendants in the exercise of their
rights to cross a picket line and to file a decertification petition. Id. at 779.
146. Id. at 780.
147. Id. at 722 n.2.
148. 218 N.L.R.B. at 683.
149. In Retail Clerks the union initiated its suit to enforce an arbitrator's award that
adopted an interpretation of a contract clause violative of § 8(e). Although the existence of
an arbitrator's award may have made a finding of good faith easier in Retail Clerks, it does
not explain why the contract right in Television Wisconsin was any less "colorable" than
the contract right in Retail Clerks.
150. 224 N.L.R.B. at 722 n.2.
151. Id. at 780.
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finding a violation). 52 This distinction still is maintained by the
Supreme Court.' 53
The Board apparently had difficulty either in understanding
or applying the distinction, for it abandoned it in International
Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots.5 4 IOMMP arose in the
context of a dispute between rival unions over which union had a
valid contract covering a ship previously operated under an agree-
ment with the IOMMP. The IOMMP picketed the ship and
brought an in rem action against the ship seeking lost wages for
the IOMMP's members who allegedly had been unjustly dis-
charged.'55 The ALJ found that the picketing violated subsections
8(b)(4)(A) and (b)(1)(B) of the Act and that the filing of the in
rem suit also violated the Act because the suit was "caused by [the
IOMMP] to be filed in this instance in support of its picketing
activities and in furtherance of its 'larger objective' of compelling
[the employer] and its subsidiaries to agree to [the IOMMP's] con-
tract and enforce it aboard the [ship]."' 6
The Board agreed with the ALJ, based on this "larger objec-
tive" and its finding that the lawsuit "may not have been taken in
complete good faith."' 57 Both the majority and the dissent in
152. Certain kinds of nonretaliatory but frivolous lawsuits, those seeking a remedy
prohibited by the Act, were unfair labor practices, therefore, even though brought in good
faith and without any intent to restrain and coerce employees. But nonfrivolous lawsuits,
those stating claims having a reasonable basis, were not unfair labor practices even though
initiated with the intent to restrain and coerce employees.
153. See Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 737 n.5. The basis for this distinction is difficult
to comprehend. Enforcement of an unlawful fine or union-security clause is no more a viola-
tion of the Act than is restraint or coercion of the exercise of § 7 rights; in fact the Board
found that the fines were unlawful because the fines had the effect of impinging on the
exercise of § 7 rights. See Booster Lodge No. 405, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 382 (1970). A union's
imposition of fines on strikebreaking former union members was not patently unlawful. The
First Circuit found a fine lawful when the strikebreakers had participated in the strike vote.
NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd., Textile Workers Local 1029, 446 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971),
rev'd, 409 U.S. 213 (1972). Justice Blackmun agreed, NLRB v. Granite State Joint Bd.,
Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213, 218-23 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), but the
Chief Justice found it a "close and difficult" question, id. at 218 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
It is difficult to understand why an attempt to enforce a fine or contract clause that is not
clearly unlawful, but is later found to be so, should receive more severe treatment than a
suit brought with the intent of preventing employees or employers from exercising their
statutory rights, and that has the effect of doing so.
154. 224 N.L.R.B. 1626 (1976), enforced, 575 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1978). IOMMP in-
volved a retaliatory, frivolous lawsuit because the Board concluded that the suit was not
brought in complete good faith and the plaintiffs claimed no valid basis for recovery. 224
N.L.R.B. at 1626 n.2.
155. 224 N.L.R.B. at 1629-30.
156. Id. at 1634.
157. Id. at 1626 n.2.
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IOMMP expressly adopted a "bad faith" exception to Clyde Tay-
lor but disagreed on its application."5'
The Board's opinion in IOMMP was ambiguous. Although the
language of the opinion referred to an unlawful objective, in reality
the holding was prefaced on a finding regarding the plaintiffs' in-
tent in the in rem action. The plaintiffs filed the suit with the os-
tensible objective of recovering alleged lost wages; however, be-
cause the Board found that the "larger objective" of the suit was to
support picketing and enforce an unlawful contract, the Board
held that the suit violated the Act. This decision was nothing
more, however, than a determination of the motivation of the
plaintiffs in bringing the suit.
Moreover, the Board did not clarify what it meant when it
adopted a bad faith exception to Clyde Taylor. Apparently, it was
harking back to a distinction that was made, but that was not dis-
positive, in Retail Clerks between a suit filed "in good faith to en-
force a colorable contract right" and the "kind of tactic calculated
to restrain employees or employers in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed by the Act." 159 The Board used that language in Clyde Taylor
to refer only to the threat of a suit and not to an actual suit, which
Clyde Taylor held was immune from prosecution as a violation of
the Act.160 To determine whether a suit was brought as a "tactic
calculated to restrain ... the exercise of rights guaranteed by the
Act" clearly requires an inquiry into the motivation of the party
bringing suit. Thus, only nine days after the Board rejected the
notion of finding a violation based on subjective intent in Televi-
sion Wisconsin, the same panel adopted an intent test in IOMMP.
In subsequent cases concerning suits filed by unions against
employers or employees, the Board consistently has used an intent
test to determine whether the suit violated the Act.16" ' The Board
158. Member Jenkins dissented, arguing that under his reading of Clyde Taylor, as
modified by International Union of Operative Eng'rs, Local Union No. 12, 220 N.L.R.B. 530
(1975), a suit does not violate the Act "absent bad faith" and that there was no evidence of
bad faith. 224 N.L.R.B. at 1627 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting in part). According to Mem-
ber Jenkins, IUOE stood for the proposition that a lawsuit to enforce a contract clause
violative of the Act is not an unfair labor practice in the absence of bad faith. Id.; see supra
note 141 and accompanying text.
159. 218 N.L.R.B. 680, 683 (1975).
160. 127 N.L.R.B. 103, 108-09 (1960).
161. See Teamsters Local Union No. 515, 259 N.L.R.B. 678, 681 (1981); Sheet Metal
Workers' Union Local 355, 254 N.L.R.B. 773, 779 (1981), modified, 716 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir.
1983); United Food & Commercial Workers, Dist. Union 227, 247 N.L.R.B. 195, 196 (1980);




and the Eighth Circuit also have applied a motivation test in de-
termining whether an attempt by an employer to obtain court en-
forcement of an illegal contract clause violated the Act.'62
Despite the shift in the Board's approach in the union-plain-
tiff cases as indicated by Retail Clerks, Television Wisconsin, and
IOMMP, the Board initially continued to follow its previous inter-
pretation of Clyde Taylor as mandating absolute protection for
employer lawsuits. In 1977 in S.E. Nichols Marcy Corp.,'6 3 for ex-
ample, the Board noted that IOMMP was an exception to the
Clyde Taylor rule,16 4 but relied on the "longstanding Board prece-
dent consistently holding that the filing of a civil suit ... does not
constitute an unfair labor practice.' 1 65 The Board did not inquire
into either the motive or basis for the suit in S.E. Nichols.
A year and a half later, in Power Systems, Inc.16 6 the Board
found, for the first time since deciding Clyde Taylor, that an em-
ployer's lawsuit was an unfair labor practice. In Power Systems the
employer's suit against its former employee alleged that the em-
ployee's unfair labor practice charges and Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) complaint against the employer
were malicious civil proceedings. The suit claimed as damages the
employer's legal fees in defending against the Board charges and
the OSHA complaint and sought a permanent injunction barring
the former employee from filing cases against the employer with
administrative agencies or in court, although it later dropped the
request for injunctive relief.167 The former employee claimed that
the suit was an unfair labor practice, and the Board agreed, finding
that the employer had no "reasonable basis" for its claim that the
former employee's charges were filed without probable cause. The
Board also found that "the true purpose behind [the employer's]
lawsuit was to penalize [the employee] for asserting his rights
under the [NLRA]. '"6 8 The Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of
the Board's order on the grounds that the record contained no ba-
sis for the Board's finding that the employer lacked probable cause
for the filing of its suit. 69 Although the court rejected the Board's
162. Associated Gen. Contractors, 245 N.L.R.B. 328, 330-31 (1979), enforced, 637 F.2d
556 (8th Cir. 1980).
163. 229 N.L.R.B. 75 (1977).
164. Id. at 75 n.2.
165. Id. at 75.
166. 239 N.L.R.B. 445 (1978), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979).
167. Id. at 446-47.
168. Id. at 449.
169. Power Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d 936, 939-40 (7th Cir. 1979).
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finding that the employer had committed an unfair labor practice,
both the Board and the court accepted the use of the two-pronged
test of motive and claim substantiality to determine the legality of
employer lawsuits.
Under the two-pronged test of Power Systems, all lawsuits
brought with a retaliatory motive and without a reasonable basis
were unfair labor practices. From 1978 until the Supreme Court's
decision in Bill Johnson's, the Board consistently held that a retal-
iatory lawsuit lacking a reasonable basis was an enjoinable unfair
labor practice whether filed by an employer or by a union.17
The evolution of Board precedent concerning the legality of
retaliatory lawsuits reflects a concern on the part of Board mem-
bers in balancing the right to sue with the national labor policy
promoting self-organization. Balancing these interests has not been
easy, and no one accommodation has stood the test of time. This
history suggests that the Bill Johnson's accommodation also will
prove unsatisfactory if employers use retaliatory suits to thwart or-
ganizational campaigns. Consequently, the constitutional basis of
the first amendment petition right must be explored to determine
whether this Article's proposed accommodation-the temporary
suspension of the right to initiate a retaliatory lawsuit during an
organizational campaign-is constitutionally permissible.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN REGULATING
RETALIATORY SUITS
Before considering the constitutionality of the accommodation
proposed in part III of this Article, an examination of the Court's
constitutional analysis in Bill Johnson's is necessary. Notwith-
standing declarations to the contrary elsewhere, 71 the Bill John-
son's Court did not hold expressly that the first amendment peti-
tion right immunizes nonfrivolous, retaliatory lawsuits from Board
initiated permanent injunctions. 72 Nevertheless, it is analytically
170. Sheet Metal Workers' Union Local 355, 254 N.L.R.B. 773, 778-80 (1981), modi-
flied, 716 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1983); United Credit Bureau of Am., Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 921,
925-26 (1979), enforced, 643 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 994 (1981); George
A. Angle, 242 N.L.R.B. 744 (1979), enforced, 683 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1982).
171. For example, in United States v. Hylton, 710 F.2d 1106, 1111 (5th Cir. 1983), the
court declared that in Bill Johnson's, "the Supreme Court has held expressly that the first
amendment right to petition protects the individuals [sic] right to file an action with a 'rea-
sonable basis' in a state tribunal." Similarly, one commentator stated that the Bill John-
son's holding was "constitutionally based." Note, The NLRB's Discovery Practice, supra
note 8, at 824.
172. The Court, however, made no attempt to show that Congress did not intend the
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appropriate to consider the right to petition defense in constitu-
tional terms even though the Court did not expressly declare that
the Constitution required its construction of the NLRA.173
Because the Court's reasoning in Bill Johnson's was somewhat
sketchy, this Article states the arguments supporting the constitu-
tional defense more completely. Thus, it will be easier to evaluate
the viability and extent of the Court's conclusion that "[t]he filing
and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined as
an unfair labor practice, even if it would not have been commenced
but for the plaintiff's desire to retaliate against the defendant for
exercising rights protected by the Act. '174 The Court should have
applied the constitutional defense in Bill Johnson's only if it found
that the following two requirements were satisfied: First, that the
employer's action in bringing suit against its workers for the pur-
pose of interfering with their exercise of statutory rights amounted
to petitioning the government for redress of grievances; 75 and sec-
Act to apply to retaliatory lawsuits. Indeed, the Court admitted that the Board's construc-
tion of the Act to prohibit retaliatory lawsuits was "not irrational." 461 U.S. at 742. Instead,
the Court relied solely on its interpretation of the first amendment petition right and the
state's interest in maintaining domestic peace to construe the Act not to apply to nonfrivo-
Ious, retaliatory lawsuits. See, e.g., id. at 741 ("We should be sensitive to these First Amend-
ment values in construing the NLRA in the present context."); id. at 742-43 ("Considering
the First Amendment right of access to the courts and the state interests. . . ,we conclude
that the Board's interpretation of the Act is untenable."). Consequently, it is appropriate to
analyze the petition right as a constitutional defense.
173. The Court conceded that it "has liberally construed [the NLRA] as prohibiting a
wide variety of employer conduct that is intended to restrain, or that has the likely effect of
restraining, employees in the exercise of protected activities." 461 U.S. at 740. It further
noted that an employer easily could use a lawsuit "as a powerful instrument of coercion or
retaliation." Id. at 740 (footnote omitted). In light of this admission and the Court's ex-
tended discussion of the constitutional issues, it is not unreasonable to believe that a major-
ity of the Court was of the view that the Board's construction of the Act was unconstitu-
tional. Justice Holmes once wrote that the Court's doctrine of avoiding constitutional issues
"more often is invoked in aid of a conclusion reached on other grounds than made itself the
basis of decision." Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104, 111 (1918) (Holmes, J., separate opinion).
Writing for the Court, Justice White avoided indicating what test he used to construe
the Act. He thus avoided an explicit decision on the constitutional questions. Four years
earlier the Court split five to four on the proper test "for construing statutes wherein consti-
tutional questions may lurk." NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 510 (1979)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
174. 461 U.S. at 743.
175. The Court stated that "the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First
Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances," id. at 741, and
used the terms "right of access to the courts" and "right to petition" interchangeably. Con-
sequently, one could analyze this first requirement in terms of whether there is a first
amendment right of access to the courts to sue for the purpose of interfering with workers'
exercise of statutory rights.
Unlike most state constitutions, which expressly protect the right of access to state
1274
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ond, that enjoining the suit would infringe the employer's right to
petition the government without an adequate countervailing
justification.
A. Right to Petition the Government for Redress of Grievances
The Bill Johnson's Court presumed that the employer's retali-
atory suit constituted petitioning the government. In support of
the proposition that a civil lawsuit between private citizens to re-
solve private differences amounted to a constitutionally protected
petitioning of the government for redress of grievances, the Court
cited only its earlier decision in California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited.
17 6
courts, see, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 ("The courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."); see
also COLO. CONST. art. II, § 6; MISS. CONST. art. HI, § 24; see generally 16A Am. Jur. 2d
Constitutional Law § 613 (1979), the United States Constitution lacks such an explicit guar-
antee, Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 839-40 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (The "'fun-
damental constitutional right of access to the courts'. . . is found nowhere in the Constitu-
tion.") (citation omitted); see also id. at 833-34 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Nevertheless, this
"nebulous" and "ill-defined" right, Doe v. Schneider, 443 F. Supp. 780, 784, 787 (D. Kan.
1978), appears to be imbedded in federal constitutional law, see Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v.
Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160-63, 165-66 (1897).
The right of court access is most often regarded as arising under the due process clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885) (the
fourteenth amendment requires that all persons "have like access to the courts of the coun-
try for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress of wrongs");
see also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) (the due process clause mandates that
all persons "shall have the protection of [their] day in court"); Doe v. Schneider, 443 F.
Supp. 780, 788 (D. Kan. 1978) (fairly comprehensive treatment of the Supreme Court's re-
cent views on the right of access to the courts).
The first amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances also has
been construed as a guarantee of the right of access to the courts. In California Motor
Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), the Court concluded it would be
destructive of the rights of association and petition to deny groups with common interests
the use of civil courts to advocate their causes and points of view. Id. at 510-11. Protection
of the right to bring a civil suit, however, is not unlimited under the first amendment right
of petition. The Supreme Court has justified limitations on the petition right when it serves
as a means or pretext for achieving substantive evil. See id. at 513-14 (holding right to
petition not immunized from regulation when used as an integral part of conduct that vio-
lates a federal statute); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-44 (1963) (state interest in
regulation of legal profession did not justify prohibition of NAACP solicitation activities).
176. 461 U.S. at 741 (citing 404 U.S. 508 (1972)). California Motor Transport con-
cerned an antitrust suit between two associations of trucking firms. The complaint alleged
that the defendant association had attempted to prevent the plaintiff firms from entering
the California market by filing lawsuits in opposition to the plaintiffs' operating applications
and their attempts to transfer or register their operating rights. 404 U.S. at 509. The Court
declared that "[t]he right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of
petition," 404 U.S. at 510, and concluded that in accordance with rights of association and
of petition, and without violating the antitrust laws, groups with common interests were
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The notion that a lawsuit between private citizens to resolve
private differences constitutes petitioning the government is not
intuitively obvious.177 The employer, the petitioning party in Bill
entitled to utilize state and federal proceedings "to advocate their causes and points of view
respecting resolution of their business and economic interests vis-&-vis their competitors,"
404 U.S. at 510-11. At the same time, however, the Court recognized an exception to this
first amendment immunity established in Eastern R.R. Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,
365 U.S. 127 (1961). The plaintiffs in California Motor Transport alleged that the defen-
dants had instituted lawsuits with the intent "to bar their competitors from meaningful
access to adjudicatory tribunals and so to usurp that decisionmaking process." 404 U.S. at
512. Relying on Noerr, the Court concluded that any effort intended to deter the plaintiffs
from invoking "the processes of the administrative agencies and courts" would meet the
Noerr exception to the first amendment immunity from antitrust liability. 404 U.S. at 512.
177. The first amendment protects the "right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. As its terms
suggested, this guarantee was understood at the time of its adoption principally as a protec-
tion of political activity to influence the legislature. See 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 198 (1971) (Declaration of Rights and Grievances of the Congress,
1765, art. XIII); id. at 217 (Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress,
1774, Resolve 8); id. at 266 (Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, 1776, art. XVI); id. at 277
(Delaware Declaration of Rights, 1776, art. XVIII); id. at 324 (Vermont Declaration of
Rights, 1777, art. XVIII); id. at 372-73 (Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, 1780, art.
XX); id. at 379 (New Hampshire Bill of Rights, 1783, art. XXXII); id. (Vol. 2) at 681 (pro-
posed amendment in Massachusetts ratifying convention); id. at 735 (proposed amendment
14 in Maryland ratifying convention); id. at 842 (proposed amendment 15 in Virginia ratify-
ing convention); id. at 913 (proposed amendment in New York ratifying convention); id. at
968 (proposed amendment 15 in North Carolina convention); id. at 1026, 1089-95, 1103 (de-
bates in House of Representatives). But see id. at 73 (Massachusetts Body of Liberties,
1641, art. 12) ("liberties to come to any publique Court, Councel, or Towne meeting, and
either by speech or writing to move any lawful, seasonable, and material question, or to
present any necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill, or information"); id. at 377 (New
Hampshire Bill of Rights, 1783, art. XIV) (every subject entitled to a certain remedy, by
recourse to the laws).
The judiciary generally ignored the petition clause. Its meaning was debated hotly in
1840, however, when the House of Representatives, in response to a large number of peti-
tions demanding the abolition of slavery, adopted a standing rule whereby it would refuse
even to accept petitions touching on slavery. John Quincy Adams led a protracted battle
against this rule, arguing that it violated the petition clause. Eventually, Adams prevailed,
and the rule was rescinded. See J.Q. ADAMS, SPEECH OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS UPON THE RIGHT
OF PEOPLE TO PETITION (J. McPherson & W. Katz eds. 1969) (reprinting portions of the
congressional debate); D. SMITH, THE RIGHT TO PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES: CON-
STITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTERPRETATIONS 81-108 (1971). The petition clause, how-
ever, received virtually no judicial elaboration until recent years. United States v. Criuk-
shank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), apparently was the first Supreme Court case in which the right to
petition received any substantial discussion. The Court stated, "The very idea of a govern-
ment, republican in form implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances." Id. at
552. Only in the last few decades have the courts begun to define the scope of the petition
clause in any serious way. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-24
(1967).
The substantive nature of the petition right nevertheless remains highly obscure. The
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Johnson's, had no grievance whatsoever with the government. Its
only grievance was with its own employees and their families. 75 At
most, the employer wanted the judicial branch of government to
issue a legally enforceable order requiring the defendants to refrain
from any further alleged wrongdoing and to pay the employer the
damages they allegedly had caused the employer to suffer. The em-
ployer was not seeking redress from the government; it wanted
only to use the government's powers of coercion to resolve a pri-
vate dispute.
Furthermore, the employer's primary intent in filing the suit
was to retaliate against the defendants for exercising their statuto-
rily protected rights. Thus, given the employer's true motive, a
more accurate and realistic characterization of the suit would be
that the employer petitioned the judiciary branch to use its coer-
cive powers to aid the employer in retaliating against the defen-
courts neither have offered a detailed specification of the right's content nor situated it
within a larger vision of the first amendment. Instead, the courts usually have cited the
petition clause in conjunction with invocations of the first amendment's speech and assem-
bly clauses, a pattern that impedes a clear understanding of the petition right itself. See,
e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-30 (1963) (expression, association, and petition);
see also Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (rights to freedom of speech, press,
assembly, and petition, "though not identical, are inseparable").
Commentators generally have ignored the petition clause. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, To-
WARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1963) (devoting no systematic discus-
sion to the petition right). Given Alexander Meiklejohn's emphasis on the first amendment's
role in protecting political speech, his silence concerning the petition right is even more
surprising. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948).
The index to the leading casebook on constitutional law, G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (10th ed. 1980), contains no entry for the petition right. Nor does
Gunther devote a chapter, or a section of any chapter, to the petition clause.
A few writers nonetheless have discussed the petition clause. See D. SMITH, supra; Note,
A First Amendment Right of Access to the Courts for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055 (1973).
For an excellent treatment of the historical antecedents to the petition clause, see Smellie,
Petition, Right of, in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 98 (1933).
178. Although the petition clause does not say that the right to petition the govern-
ment is limited to grievances against the government, the Supreme Court has suggested in
dictum that the resolution of private differences is not entitled to first amendment protec-
tion. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court concluded that the NAACP ac-
tions in organizing and sponsoring litigation constituted political association protected by
the first amendment. The Court reasoned:
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving private
differences; it is a means of achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by
all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community in
this country ... [U]nder the conditions of modem government, litigation may well be
the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances.
Id. at 429-31. One cannot contend seriously that litigation is "the sole practicable avenue
open" to employers when they have grievances against their employees.
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dants for exercising their statutory rights.
179
Additionally, the Court's reliance on California Motor Trans-
port was ill placed. The California Motor Transport Court did not
hold that a purely private suit between private litigants to resolve
private differences amounted to petitioning the government for re-
dress of grievances. California Motor Transport did not involve
purely private disputes; instead, the right to petition administra-
tive agencies to seek review of adverse agency decisions was at
stake. The right to obtain judicial review of administrative agency
orders affecting the heavily regulated trucking industry, in which
operating rights must be obtained from government agencies, is a
far cry from the right to obtain judicial resolution of a purely pri-
vate dispute. 80
179. Moreover, to the extent that freedom of association was invoked by the defen-
dants' efforts to join together to bargain collectively, the employer's suit was an attempt to
enlist the coercive powers of the state to retaliate against the defendants' exercise of statu-
tory rights with clear constitutional overtones.
Under this analysis, the most appropriate precedent is Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948). In Shelley judicial enforcement of valid but racially restrictive covenants was denied
because courts could not provide the critical power to effectuate discrimination between
private individuals. Viewing courts as accomplices to retaliatory lawsuits produces a far dif-
ferent constitutional conclusion than the one reached in Bill Johnson's. The Shelley Court
summarily rejected the property owners' claim that denying them the right to seek judicial
enforcement of valid racially restrictive covenants impermissibly denied them access to the
courts. Id. at 22. The Court did not find that the property owners in Shelley were exercising
the right to petition government for redress; instead, they simply were enlisting the govern-
ment for assistance in promoting their racism. Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470
(1973) ("Invidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising free-
dom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded af-
firmative constitutional protections.").
180. In this context of a heavily regulated industry, the Court stated that "[t]he right
of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition." 404 U.S. at 510. In
support of this statement the Court cited two cases that struck down restrictions on prison-
ers' rights to file writs of habeas corpus. The two cases cited were Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483, 485 (1969) ("Since the basic purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully
incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is fundamental that access of prisoners to the courts
for the purpose of presenting their complaints may not be denied or obstructed."), and Ex
parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) ("The state and its officers may not abridge or impair
[a prisoner's] right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus.").
It now is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the
courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Cruz
v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). The origin of that right
is the due process guarantee of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974). The right of access includes collateral review of criminal convic-
tions, and civil cases involving constitutional rights. See In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 785
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (collecting cases in which various financial barriers to suit were
held unconstitutional). The right, however, is neither absolute nor unconditional. Id.
Access to the courts to file the "Great Writ", 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1982), however, is
distinguishable from access to the courts to resolve a private dispute. See Johnson v. Avery,
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Prior to Bill Johnson's, the leading decision on whether the
commencement of a civil suit constituted petitioning the govern-
ment was NAACP v. Button.181 In Button the Court invalidated a
state's attempt to preclude the NAACP from funding group legal
services. The Court concluded that the NAACP activities in or-
ganizing and sponsoring litigation constituted political association
protected by the first amendment. 182The Button Court, however,
was careful to distinguish litigation undertaken by members of a
minority group to achieve equality of treatment from litigation un-
dertaken as "a technique of resolving private differences."183
The language in California Motor Transport was less precise,
but the facts required the Court to consider only litigation arising
out of decisions by government agencies concerning applications to
acquire operating rights or to transfer or register those rights. The
Court suggested that the right of access to the courts was one as-
pect of the right of petition, but it did not indicate that this right
of petition included private lawsuits resolving private differences.
Any such broad right would be inconsistent with decisions that
have rejected arguments that access to the courts in private law-
suits has constitutional implications.1 84 Certainly the authorities
393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) ("This Court has constantly emphasized the fundamental impor-
tance of the writ of habeas corpus in our constitutional scheme, and the Congress has
demonstrated its solicitude for the vigor of the Great Writ. The Court has steadfastly in-
sisted that 'there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired.'" (footnotes and cita-
tions omitted)).
181. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
182. See supra note 178 for a discussion of the Court's decision.
183. 371 U.S. at 429.
184. The Court has allowed the state to impose access costs on litigants seeking to
petition the judiciary. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam) (permitting
$25 filing fee as condition for review of denial of welfare benefits when alternative avenues
for appeal were available); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (permitting $50 filing
fee in voluntary bankruptcy proceeding). But see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)
(due process dictates that states may not abridge indigent litigants' access to the courts
based solely on their inability to pay a filing fee in divorce action).
The Boddie holding on the right of access to civil courts is severely restricted. The
Court indicated this restriction when, soon after Boddie was decided, it denied certiorari in
a handful of suits by indigents seeking free access to civil courts for a variety of purposes.
See, e.g., Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971). Among the unheard cases
was a suit by an indigent mother who was denied court-appointed counsel to defend her in a
state civil suit to declare her an unfit mother and take away five of her seven children.
Kaufman v. Carter, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 964 (1971).
In United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), a particularly sympathetic indi-
gent-with a tale of woe that included a blameless falling into debt, a pack of ruthless
creditors, no income, no assets, a dependent wife and mother, and an infant child hospital-
ized with cystic fibrosis-sought escape from his unfortunate past and a new start in life
through release in bankruptcy. The only obstacle was the $50 bankruptcy fee which, accord-
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cited by the California Motor Transport Court-two decisions
that struck down regulations limiting access to the courts by pris-
oners filing writs of habeas corpus' 85 -lend no support to the argu-
ment that a private lawsuit constitutes petitioning the government.
Moreover, the California Motor Transport Court held that the
right of access to government agency hearings "[did] not necessa-
rily give [the carriers] immunity from the antitrust laws." 186 In-
deed, the Court expressly limited a carrier's right of access. The
carrier's right of access exists "to defeat applications of its compet-
itors for certificates as highway carriers. 1 8 7 But if the carrier's
purpose in petitioning the agencies and courts is "to eliminate an
applicant as a competitor by denying him free and meaningful ac-
cess to the agencies and courts,"'8 8 then the carrier's petitioning
activity is not protected by the first amendment.'89
ing to the trial court's findings, he was completely unable to pay, and which under the rule
of Boddie he asked the Court to hold violative of due process. The Court rejected his claim
because he did not satisfy the two requirements of Boddie that a fundamental interest be at
stake and that the state's monopoly over resolution of disputes concerning that interest be
complete. Id. at 445. Although not expressly articulated, the Court's holding in Kras implied
that the right of access to bankruptcy court was not a fundamental interest.
Similarly, the Court rejected a claim of right to access to civil courts in Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam), in which the Court refused to find an equal pro-
tection or due process violation in Oregon's requirement of a $25 appellate filing fee from an
indigent seeking judicial review of an administrative reduction in his old-age assistance. The
Court characterized the case as implicating no fundamental interest. Id. at 659. Because
independent constitutional rights cannot be denied to indigents by means of a fee, see, e.g.,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel), the Court apparently did not
consider access to the courts to be an independent constitutional right.
185. See supra note 180.
186. 404 U.S. at 513.
187. Id. at 515. "[A]ny carrier has the right of access to agencies and courts, within the
limits, of course, of their prescribed procedures, in order to defeat applications of its com-
petitors for certificates as highway carriers." Id.
188. Id.
189. The Court stated:
First Amendment rights may not be used as the means or the pretext for achieving
"substantive evils" (see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444) which the legislature has
the power to control. Certainly the constitutionality of the antitrust laws is not open to
debate. A combination of entrepreneurs to harass and deter their competitors from
having "free and unlimited access" to the agencies and courts, to defeat that right by
massive, concerted, and purposeful activities of the group are ways of building up one
empire and destroying another. . . . If these facts are proved, a violation of the anti-
trust laws has been established. If the end result is unlawful, it matters not that the
means used in violation may be lawful.
404 U.S. at 515.
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B. Adequate Justification for Infringement of Petition Right
The Court's view in Bill Johnson's that lawsuits to resolve pri-
vate disputes are protected by the petition clause is debatable.190
Assuming, however, that the Court continues to construe the first
amendment to mean that litigation initiated to resolve private dis-
putes amounts to petitioning the government for redress of griev-
ances, an adequate countervailing justification may exist for per-
mitting the temporary enjoining of retaliatory suits arising out of
labor disputes. The Court apparently assumed that no governmen-
tal interests could justify the restriction of a genuine exercise of
the freedom to petition the government. 19' Not only is this abso-
lute view of the first amendment freedom difficult to support, but
it also conflicts with dicta in Button and with the holding in Cali-
fornia Motor Transport.
192
190. An alternative analysis exists for reaching the same result. Under this analysis,
retaliatory employer lawsuits do not amount to petitioning the government for redress of
grievances. Not every lawsuit that appears as an effort to influence the government actually
is an exercise of the first amendment petition right. A retaliatory lawsuit, although disguised
as petitioning, is simply an effort to interfere directly with workers' self-organization rights.
In that case, the petitioning activity is not entitled to first amendment protection because it
is not a genuine exercise of first amendment rights. See Clipper Exxpress v. Rocky Moun-
tain Motor Tariff Bureau, Inc., 690 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1982) (lodging formal protests with
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was not petitioning activity entitled to first
amendment protection because the object of the protests was to interfere with a competitor
rather than to influence the ICC), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1227 (1983).
191. The Court seemed to assume that merely raising the first amendment issue pre-
cluded application of the NLRA. Recognition of the existence of a potential conflict between
the first amendment and the NLRA should constitute the beginning of the analysis, not the
resolution of the conflict. As the Supreme Court stated in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949):
[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or press to make a
course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced,
or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed . . . . Such an
expansive interpretation of the constitutional guarantees of speech and press would
make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of
trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society.
The issue presented by Bill Johnson's was whether a retaliatory lawsuit should be removed
from NLRA scrutiny simply because of a first amendment interest. Because it held only
that first amendment interests were implicated, the Court did not resolve this issue
adequately.
192. Arguably, the doctrines of standing and justiciability are restrictions on the first
amendment petition rights of plaintiffs who, in good faith, believe that they have been ag-
grieved and who earnestly desire to persuade the judiciary to act. See, e.g., Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464 (1982) (denying standing to persons challenging HEW's gratuitous conveyance of prop-
erty to a religious college); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976)
(denying standing to persons unable to obtain medical services at hospitals granted federal
tax benefits; plaintiffs challenged revenue rulings that defined the hospitals as "charitable"
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In Button the Court suggested that state interests in regulat-
ing the solicitation of legal work could support a narrow statutory
limitation on first amendment freedoms. 9 ' Because governmental
interests can justify infringement in some situations, the Bill
Johnson's Court should have weighed conflicting interests and
foregone an absolutist position. The nation has significant interests
in having its workers engage in collective activity in a coercion-free
atmosphere.194 The extent to which these interests support restric-
tions on the freedom to petition unfortunately was never clarified
in Bill Johnson's.
In California Motor Transport the Court emphasized that al-
though the defendants had joined together to exercise their first
amendment right of petition, they were not immune from liability
under the antitrust laws. The Court expressly acknowledged that
there were limits to the exercise of the right of petition. First
amendment rights could not be used to achieve unlawful results,
regardless of the lawfulness of the means employed. 9 '
This recognition that a court could infringe upon the right of
petition and that a statute could regulate the right if adequate jus-
tification existed was stated over the vigorous objection of Justices
Stewart and Brennan. They took the absolutist position that no
governmental interests should support restrictions on the freedom
to petition.9 6 The majority, however, rejected this absolutist posi-
tion and held that the defendants violated the antitrust laws if
their exercise of the right of petition was "used as the means or the
pretext for achieving 'substantive evils' which the legislature has
institutions qualifying for such benefits). The Court has not suggested that the doctrines of
standing and justiciability conflict with the petition right, but it is possible that a standing
or justiciability standard could be adopted that would unduly restrict the right to petition.
193. 371 U.S. at 438-43.
194. On the other hand, states have significant interests in allowing their residents to
recover for injuries suffered. Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-45 (1974)
(finding that states have great latitude in enforcing legal remedies for private individuals
suing for defamation).
195. See supra note 189.
196. 404 U.S. at 516-17 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart, who was joined by
Justice Brennan, disagreed with the majority's statement that the defendants' joint agree-
ment to exercise their petition right "does not necessarily give them immunity from the
antitrust laws." Id. at 517 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting the majority's opinion at 513).
Justice Stewart concurred, however, because the application of the antitrust laws would
have been justified if "the real intent of the conspirators was not to invoke the processes of
the administrative agencies and courts, but to discourage and ultimately to prevent the re-




the power to control."19
The Bill Johnson's Court's discussion of whether any justifica-
tion would permit infringement of the right of petition was limited
to an acknowledgment that a frivolous suit might be enjoined. Ac-
cording to the Court, however, that prohibition would not infringe
upon the right of petition because the commencement of a frivo-
lous suit is not constitutionally protected. In prohibiting the per-
manent enjoining of all suits that raise a genuine issue, the Court
appears to have adopted the absolutist position that the majority
rejected in California Motor Transport.195
In sum, the Bill Johnson's Court ignored two principal obsta-
cles to employing the right to petition the government as a bar to
enjoining an employer's retaliatory suit. The Court did not address
(1) why retaliatory lawsuits to resolve private disputes were peti-
tions to the government, and (2) why the government's interest in
protecting employees' collective activities from employer interfer-
ence failed to justify regulation of the right to petition the
government.
This Article does not, however, advocate the overruling of the
Bill Johnson's holding that the Board cannot permanently enjoin a
nonfrivolous, retaliatory lawsuit. In view of the Court's unanimous
opinion, there is no reason to believe that the Court will reconsider
its construction of the petition clause as protecting private lawsuits
initiated with a retaliatory motive. Moreover, a permanent ban on
initiating a reasonably based suit ignores the very substantial state
interest in providing a remedy to an aggrieved party. As Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion emphasizes, however, the Court's de-
cision does not preclude the possibility of Board regulation of re-
197. 404 U.S. at 515. The "substantive evil" that the defendants were accused of at-
tempting to achieve by their exercise of the right of petition was the harassment of competi-
tors in an effort to deter them from enjoying free and unlimited access to the agencies and
the courts.
198. In view of the Bill Johnson's Court's position that instituting a baseless suit is
not even an exercise of a constitutional right, an alternative interpretation of California
Motor Transport is possible. Because California Motor Transport concerned the repeated
filing of baseless lawsuits, the case could be read as not involving the exercise of a constitu-
tional right at all. If California Motor Transport did not concern the exercise of a constitu-
tional right, then the Court's statement that the exercise of first amendment rights may be
prohibited when they are used to achieve a result prohibited by statute was entirely unnec-
essary. Even if one assumes that the California Motor Transport Court's observation was
unnecessary to the outcome in that case, there is no doubt that compelling governmental
interests may justify regulating the exercise of a constitutional right. See, e.g., United Pub.
Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (The government may prohibit nonpartisan govern-
ment workers from engaging in overt, partisan political activity on behalf of particular can-
didates or particular political viewpoints.).
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taliatory suits in a manner that has "less direct impact on the
plaintiff's First Amendment rights."'99 A temporary suspension of
the right to initiate a retaliatory lawsuit during an organizing cam-
paign has a less direct impact on the right of petition. In the next
part, this Article concludes that such a temporary ban is consistent
with well-established first amendment doctrines, is sensitive to the
state's interest in providing a remedy, and promotes the national
labor policy of prohibiting employer interference with employees'
self-organization rights.
VI. TEMPORARILY SUSPENDING THE RIGHT TO INITIATE A
RETALIATORY SUIT DURING AN ORGANIZATIONAL CAMPAIGN IS A
PROPER ACCOMMODATION
The Court has not outlined the perimeters of the first amend-
ment petition right. An analogy to first amendment protections af-
forded speech will demonstrate, however, that this proposal does
not violate first amendment principles.
A. The O'Brien Test
In United States v. O'Brien 00 the defendant was convicted of
burning his Selective Service registration card. He contended that
his act was a symbolic gesture intended to express his opposition
to the war in Vietnam and to persuade others to adopt his point of
view. Therefore, he claimed that his action was protected by the
first amendment. 0 '
The Court held that the act of burning a draft card was not
protected by the first amendment and developed a four-part bal-
ancing test to determine the constitutionality of statutes that inci-
dentally impinge upon speech. A government regulation is consti-
tutional if it (1) is within the constitutional power of the
government, (2) promotes an important government interest, (3)
does not suppress free expression, and (4) is an incidental restric-
tion on a first amendment freedom. °2
Under the O'Brien test retaliatory lawsuits may be stayed
temporarily under the NLRA. The first two elements of the test do
not present analytically difficult problems. It was established long
ago that Congress may regulate labor-management relations pursu-
199. 461 U.S. at 756 (Brennan, J., concurring).
200. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
201. Id. at 370.
202. Id. at 377.
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ant to its commerce power. 20 3 Thus, the NLRA is "within the con-
stitutional power of the Government."20 NLRA regulation also
passes the second part of the O'Brien test because "it furthers an
important . . . governmental interest."20 5 The Court has asserted
the need for governmental protection of employee self-organization
from employer interference.0 8
The third element of the test examines the intent of the regu-
lation in question. The NLRA is not designed to regulate speech.
The primary aims of the Act are (1) to protect free choice of work-
ers to associate amongst themselves and to select representatives
of their own choosing and (2) to promote collective bargaining.
Any impact the Act may have on speech is incidental to this main
purpose.
The balancing element of the O'Brien test requires that the
regulation's "incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms [be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest. '20 7 The regulation must be analyzed to determine if
its purpose could have been accomplished by some means less bur-
densome on first amendment freedoms.0 8
The temporary suspension of the right to initiate a retaliatory
lawsuit during an organizational campaign seeks to achieve the
protection of employee self-organization activity during the early
stages of a campaign. Whether a lawsuit can be suspended depends
solely on the employer's motivation for filing the lawsuit. The pro-
posed accommodation, therefore, is less restrictive than a perma-
nent prohibition of all retaliatory lawsuits and is less restrictive
than a temporary ban on all lawsuits, regardless of motive, filed
during an organizational campaign. As shown earlier,20 9 however,
the Bill Johnson's accommodation, which permits sanctions only
after the suit is concluded, is not sufficient to accomplish the Act's
purpose in the organizational setting.
Even though the Supreme Court considers retaliatory lawsuits
203. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
204. 391 U.S. at 377.
205. Id.
206. E.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 33 ("Discrimination and coercion to
prevent the free exercise of the right of employees to self-organization and representation is
a proper subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority.").
207. 391 U.S. at 377.
208. For a discussion of the least restrictive alternative analysis, see Ely, Flag Dese-
cration: A Case Study in the Rules of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1484-85 (1975).
209. See supra text accompanying notes 66-92.
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to be an aspect of petitioning the government and, therefore, enti-
tled to first amendment protection, the first amendment should
not prevent a temporary prohibition on retaliatory lawsuits during
an organizing drive. Because the temporary ban does not regulate
the content of the lawsuit, the proposed Board regulation of retali-
atory lawsuits should satisfy the O'Brien test.
B. Other Doctrines Supporting a Temporary Ban
Three other established doctrines in first amendment jurispru-
dence also suggest that the proposed temporary ban on retaliatory
suits should survive a constitutional attack. First, the "time, place
and manner" doctrine articulated in Cox v. New Hampshire21 ° au-
thorizes content-neutral regulations designed to protect significant
state interests. Under this doctrine, "activities ...protected by
the First Amendment are subject to reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions."211 The proposal in this Article is strictly con-
tent-neutral; it regulates only the timing of the lawsuit. Regardless
of the content of the lawsuit, if it is initiated at a particularly sen-
sitive time with the requisite intent, it is subject to a temporary
injunction. The proposal is concerned with the impact on employee
self-organization that a lawsuit may have because of its timing.
212
Consequently, the proposal should withstand judicial scrutiny
under the "time, place and manner" doctrine.
210. 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941). In Cox the Court upheld a statute prohibiting parad-
ing on a public street without a special license. The statute did not contravene the first
amendment because it was confined to limiting the "time, place, and manner" of parades so
that they would not "unduly disturb" other public uses of the streets. Id. at 575-76. For a
critique of the view that content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions adequately
protect speech interests, see Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Mis-
placed Trust in the Judgment of Public Officials, 32 BUFFALO L. RaV. 175 (1983).
211. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647
(1981). In Heffron the Court upheld a regulation prohibiting the Hari Krishnas from distrib-
uting literature or soliciting donations at a state fair except at fixed booths, which they
could rent.
212. It might be claimed that the proposal is not content-neutral on two grounds.
First, the restriction focuses only on one speaker, the one taking the management viewpoint.
Second, the content of the lawsuit will be examined to determine the amount and type of
damages sought and to evaluate the nature of the deposition questions. See supra note 90.
Upon examination, however, both of these claims fail. First, the Board remains free to pro-
scribe any union lawsuit that impermissibly interferes with the operation of the Act. See
supra text accompanying notes 135-62. Second, the reason for examining the prayer for
relief and the nature of discovery is to determine the true motive for the suit, see supra note
90. The motive requirement protects the employer because it requires the General Counsel
to establish improper motive to enjoin the lawsuit temporarily, and it provides a defense for
the employer who can show that it would have brought the suit notwithstanding its retalia-
tory motive. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
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Second, the Court has held that a content-based regulation
does not contravene the first amendment when the restriction on
first amendment activity is concerned with the secondary impact
of the activity, not the primary impact of the message itself, and
when first amendment freedoms are only partially impaired and
not totally denied.213 The proposal satisfies the requirements of
this doctrine even if it is viewed as a content-based regulation.
2 14
The restriction is concerned with the secondary impact of the suit
on the employees and not on the nature of relief sought or the fact
that management is the allegedly aggrieved party. Furthermore,
regulating the timing of the suit is merely a partial impairment of
the right to sue and is not a total denial of the exercise of that
right.
Third, the Court has distinguished between the first amend-
ment interests inherent in different types of first amendment ac-
tivity and upheld limitations when the first amendment interests
are marginal. 5 Although the Court has declared that the right to
initiate a purely private lawsuit is constrained by first amendment
prohibitions, a careful examination of this right reveals that it is
on the periphery of the first amendment petition right.2 10 The
right to initiate a retaliatory lawsuit against private individuals has
such a tangential relationship to first amendment values that it
should not outweigh the primary purpose and effect of the pro-
posed limitation on the right to sue: reducing employer coercion
during the most sensitive stages of an organizing campaign. Be-
cause the restriction on the timing of a retaliatory lawsuit does not
have a substantial effect on the ability of the employer to sue at a
later time, such a limitation should be within the power of the gov-
213. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), the Court upheld a
zoning ordinance that prohibited "adult movie theatres" from locating in close proximity to
each other. The Court reasoned that the law was concerned with the secondary impact of a
high concentration of adult movie theatres-a concentration of these theatres resulted in
undesirable changes to the neighborhood-and not with the suppression of the message.
The Court also noted that the law did not ban these theatres totally; it just dispersed them.
Compare Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (zoning ordinance that forbade all
live entertainment, including nude dancing, in a commercial zone violated the first
amendment).
214. See supra note 212.
215. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). In Buckley the Court distin-
guished between the speech interest inherent in federal election campaign contributions and
campaign expenditures, and upheld the limitations imposed on contributions, but invali-
dated those related to expenditures. The Court found that the speech interests in campaign
contributions were marginal, but that campaign expenditures were related directly to the
expression of political values and, therefore, were on a higher level of constitutional values.




Private lawsuits contain elements of petitioning activity and,
therefore, are entitled to first amendment protection. Yet, because
the proposal does not regulate the content of the suit and merely
regulates the timing of the suit without prohibiting it altogether,
the first amendment should not prevent the application of the
NLRA to retaliatory lawsuits brought at the outset of an organiza-
tional campaign.
C. State Interest in Providing Employers Access to Judiciary
Furthermore, the proposed temporary ban properly accounts
for the state interest in maintaining domestic peace. Unlike the
permanent injunction the Board sought in Bill Johnson's, a tem-
porary ban does not frustrate the state concern by refusing the
states the right to redress an otherwise actionable wrong. The re-
fusal to redress an otherwise actionable wrong creates disrespect
for the law and encourages the victim to take matters into his own
hands. A temporary ban of a lawsuit, as contrasted with a perma-
nent ban, does not create the same disrespect for the law or the
same encouragement of violence.
The state also has an interest in providing a timely remedy.
Between the commission of the tort and the end of the organiza-
tional campaign, conditions may change, witnesses may disappear,
and possible evidence may become stale or unavailable. The propo-
sal, however, should not unduly impinge upon the state's interest
in adjudicating issues in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful
time. If the employer can show that its reason for suing during the
midst of an organizational campaign is to avoid having its claim
foreclosed by circumstances beyond its control, then the General
Counsel will be unable to demonstrate that the employer's suit is
retaliatory, and the suit will be allowed to continue. 17 On the
other hand, if the employer's claim that a delay will foreclose its
opportunity to assert its cause of action is a sham, then the Board
is likely to find a retaliatory motive, and the suit will be enjoined
until the termination of the protected period.
D. Striking the Proper Balance
On balance, the public interest in collective bargaining that is
served by the temporary condemnation of employer use of judicial
217. See supra note 89.
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adjudicative processes to interfere with employee organizing efforts
outweighs the resulting restraint upon first amendment freedoms
and state interests. In allowing retaliatory lawsuits, the Court now
has armed the employer with a new weapon entirely alien to the
statutory scheme and with absolutely no relevance to the merits of
the labor dispute.21
It appears that the courts and the Board have a dilemma. On
the one hand, the protection of the right to sue has been a basic
and cherished ideal of our democracy. On the other hand, collec-
tive bargaining with its emphasis on self-organization has been the
cornerstone of our national labor policy since the passage of the
NLRA in 1935. The ambiguity of some of the Board decisions con-
cerning the legality of retaliatory lawsuits and the not "entirely
consistent 219 character of those decisions reflects a real concern on
the part of Board members regarding this issue.
This predicament, however, occurred essentially because of
the dilemma posed in balancing the rights of the individual em-
ployer with the self-organization needs of the workers. "Rights"
are relative. It is not possible to have a right of petition that con-
siders only employer rights and does not provide for the rights of
the workers. The proposed temporary suspension of the employer's
right to file a retaliatory suit is an attempt to strike a balance be-
tween the rights of employees and the rights of employers, as well
as to take into account the state's interests.
The original thrust of the NLRA was to make collective bar-
gaining the law of the land and a protected activity under that law.
The Board was created to function as an agency administering the
representation process and to protect the section 7 rights of em-
ployees. One of the most important reasons for the Board's crea-
tion was to remove the representation issue from the arena of eco-
nomic conflict and to substitute an administrative procedure that
provided employees with the right to organize unions. In carrying
218. As Justice Black has said, "The object of the National Labor Relations Act was to
bring about agreements by collective bargaining, not to add fuel to the fire by encouraging
libel suits with their inevitable irritations and dispute-prolonging tendencies." Linn v. Plant
Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 68 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting). The Bill Johnson's Court
underestimated the damage that retaliatory suits might inflict on the equilibrium between
the employees' organizational right and the employers' right to resist an organized work
force. It also overestimated the effectiveness of the restraint that will result from the super-
imposed requirement that the suit contain a genuine issue of material fact or law and the
after the fact remedy of reimbursement for legal expenses if the employee ultimately
prevails in the lawsuit.
219. Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 742.
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out its charge, the Board must utilize innovative ways to lessen the
efficacy of creative attempts by both labor and management to
thwart the purposes of the Act. Resolute and sophisticated em-
ployers are very likely to attempt to use nonfrivolous, retaliatory
lawsuits to impede employee self-organization. The proposed tem-
porary suspension of the right to institute a retaliatory lawsuit is
exactly the type of solution that will reduce the might of the "pow-
erful instrument of coercion '220 that the Court apparently legalized
in Bill Johnson's.
A requirement that the Board seek a federal court injunction
under section 10(j) to suspend the prosecution of a state court law-
suit poses no constitutional problems or significant impairment of
state interests. The Constitution does not prohibit federal courts
from intervening in state court proceedings. The basic principles of
comity and separateness, although not constitutional in scope, are
designed to prevent unseemly conflicts between the federal courts
and the state courts in private litigation. These principles have
been determined inapplicable, however, when the federal govern-
ment invokes jurisdiction of its courts in aid of its rights and in the
enforcement of its laws.
221
Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated clearly that the
Board may move to prevent "irreparable injury to a national inter-
est. '222 In preventing irreparable injury to the national interest in
preserving self-organization rights, "[i]t has long been held that
the Board, though not granted express statutory remedies, may ob-
tain appropriate and traditional ones to prevent frustration of the
act.,,223
The proposal does not conflict with the Court's Bill Johnson's
decision. In Bill Johnson's the Court held that the Board could not
permanently enjoin the prosecution of a well-founded retaliatory
lawsuit. As Justice Brennan's concurring opinion emphasizes, how-
ever, the Board "may take other measures which have less direct
impact on the plaintiff's First Amendment rights. '224 A temporary
suspension of the right to sue during an organizational campaign is
a less restrictive means of assuring employees their right to engage
in self-organization free of employer interference.
220. Id. at 740.
221. E.g., United States v. Phillips, 33 F. Supp. 261 (N.D. Okla. 1940), rev'd on other
grounds, 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
222. NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 145 (1971).
223. Id. at 142.




Retaliatory lawsuits during union-organizing drives present an
interesting mix of competing interests. Because the suit may inter-
fere with employee self-organization, the NLRA's prohibition of
employer interference with union-organizing drives is implicated.
However, these lawsuits also constitute a form of petition that war-
rants protection under the first amendment. Any regulation of a
retaliatory lawsuit, therefore, must not impinge unduly upon the
employer's petition rights. Moreover, the states have an interest in
providing a remedy for violations of their laws. This Article has
suggested how employer lawsuits during organizing campaigns can
be regulated without either violating the first amendment or ignor-
ing the state's interest.
The Bill Johnson's decision reflects a concern for the first
amendment rights of employers. It was clear to the Court that a
permanent ban on a retaliatory suit would impinge unduly on the
first amendment rights of employers. To protect these rights, the
Court struck down the Board's efforts to enjoin such suits perma-
nently. This Article has argued that a more sound approach for the
Board, and one that is not inconsistent with the Court's decision in
Bill Johnson's, is to forego permanent injunctions and instead to
seek temporary bans on retaliatory lawsuits. This approach ensures
that the first amendment rights of employers are protected but
still recognizes that coercive effects must be regulated by the least
restrictive alternative available. The approach presented in this
Article accommodates the competing first amendment values and
the NLRA issues that are inherent in any retaliatory lawsuit and
preserves the state's interest in providing a remedy.
"[U]nion busting remains one of the hottest games in town.
Destroying initial organizational efforts, thwarting employee free
choice of union representation, and neutralizing or ousting the in-
cumbent union remain a very large part of the employer
sphere. 12 25 In Bill Johnson's the Supreme Court paved the way for
employers to add another weapon to their arsenal to use in frus-
trating the organizational efforts of their employees. As more em-
ployers seek judicial aid in thwarting organizing drives, use of the
retaliatory suit tactic likely will increase. Unfortunately, the con-
stitutional constraints and the state interests at stake do not allow
for an easy solution to this problem. The proposal outlined in this
225. L. MODJESKA, NLRB PRACTICE 123 (1983).
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Article, however, should reduce the harassment and fear of liability
engendered by retaliatory suits during organizational campaigns
and, perhaps, would reduce the incidence of frivolous suits.
